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Recent developments in the Horn of Africa - Eritrea, Sudan,
and Somalia - have led to troubling humanitarian concerns. Forced
conscription, violation of basic human dignities, and even genocide
have led citizens of these countries to flee by any means necessary,
seeking refuge in nations where they no longer fear a risk of persecu-
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tion. To those escaping these horrid conditions, the nearest democratic
states are the relatively small countries of Israel, the closest safe haven
via land, and Malta, the closest safe haven via the Mediterranean Sea.
Unfortunately for those seeking refuge, they often encounter many
obstacles that are seemingly none of their fault, whether it be manda-
tory detention in substandard facilities in Malta or bureaucratic
backlog in Israel. This article seeks to identify current asylum handling
procedures in Israel and Malta while identifying deficiencies that have
put those nations in violation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its subsequent 1967 Protocol.
Malta and Israel experience very similar situations on the
surface. Neither nation has had much experience with accepting
asylum seekers prior to this most recent phenomenon. Additionally,
both nations are relatively small and have limited resources available
to them, and they are both located closest to the nations where the
refugees originate.' However, as we shall see, the similarities between
the nations' handling of asylum seekers are of a fairly short list. The
differences between the two nations are great. This could be due to the
legal procedures provided for asylum seekers (or lack thereof, in
Malta's situation), ratios of asylum actually granted, or even the future
paths Israel and Malta are seeking with asylum seekers. While Malta
may be criticized for its lack of asylum procedures or harsh detention
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I Kenya, home to many refugee camps, is actually the closest country to the Horn of
Africa that hosts refugees. However, it has been subject to a lot of concern regarding
the safety of asylum seekers, especially in Kenyan police stations and other detention
centers. See Kenya: Flagrant Violations ofHuman Rights Against Asylum Seekers and
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conditions, it still boasts some of the highest asylum grant rates in the
European Union.2 Comparatively speaking, Israel only granted asylum
once in a span of two years from 2010-2011, while rejecting over 3,000
other applications. 3
This article seeks to explore the conditions and procedures
asylum seekers currently face in both Israel and Malta. It will begin by
discussing the issues facing the citizens of Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia,
including findings by several prominent international sources, attes-
ting to the fact most, if not all, asylum seekers originating from these
countries are in need of international protection. The article will then
briefly discuss the relevant provisions and protections asylum seekers
shall be afforded under the 1951 Convention and subsequent Protocol,
to which both Israel and Malta are signatories. Next, the article looks at
the individual countries' histories with asylum seekers, the present
status of asylum seekers in each country, discussing relevant law and
procedures regarding asylum seekers, and critiquing the two nations'
laws and procedures under the rights guaranteed under the Conven-
tion. The article will then conclude with a brief survey of one other
country, Italy, which stands out as a geographically-proximate country
that has greater resources, and a survey of statistics regarding Eritrean,
Somalian, and Sudanese asylum seekers around the world. This will
provide us a better understanding of how Israel and Malta compare to
other nations and to each other.
I. THE TROUBLES IN ERITREA, SUDAN, AND SOMALIA
A relatively young state, Eritrea established formal indepen-
dence from Ethiopia on April 27th, 1993, following an UN-monitored
referendum on independence. Eritrea is currently a single party state
2 European Commission, Eurostat: Asylum Statistics, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
statistics explained/index.php/Asylum statistics [hereinafter European Asylum Statis-
tics]. Malta returned positive decisions on over 90 percent of first-time asylum
applications, highest in the European Union. However, it did return positive decisions
on fewer than five percent of final decisions.
3 Hadas Yaron, Nurit Hasimshony-Yaffe, & John Campbell, 'Infiltrators" or
Refugees? An Analysis of Israel's Policy Towards African Asylum-Seekers, 51 INT'L
MIGRATION J. 144 (2013).
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governed by the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).4 The
PFDJ was meant to serve as a transitional government until democratic
elections were held.5 General multi-party elections were, however,
postponed in 1998 due to the outbreak of war with Ethiopia. To this
day, no democratic elections have been held, and the leader of the
PFDJ, President Isasias Afewerki, has remained in his position
unopposed.6
The situation in Eritrea is troubling. Torture, arbitrary deten-
tion, and severe restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and
religion freedom remain the norm in Eritrea.7 Perhaps most troubling
is the forced labor and military restrictions the country imposes on its
youth. Children may be forced into military training at the age of 14 as
part of their school curriculum.8 If they refuse military training, the
Eritrean youths risk their family members' arrest. 9 Routine conscrip-
tion round-ups, known as giffas, are conducted by police or military
forces.10 Refusing to join the military may lead to on-the-spot execu-
tion, and desertion can lead to "shoot to kill" orders and detention for
prolonged periods." Eritrean law states that able-bodied adults
between the ages of 18 and 40 must serve eighteen months of military
service. However, government practice prolongs that period indefi-
nitely. The national service conscripts are poorly fed, receive inade-
quate medical care, are underpaid (to the tune of less than 30 US
4 Karen Jacobsen, Laurie Lijnders, & Sara Robinson, Ransom, Collaborators,
Corruption: Sinai Trafficking and Transnational Networks from Eritrea to Israel. A
Case Study of the Eritrean Migration System 4 (Feinstein International Center, Tufts




For detailed findings on the situation in Eritrea, see Human Rights Watch: Eritrea,
https://www.hrw.org/africa/eritrea (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Eritrea].
U.S. Department of Labor's 2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor,
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf.
9 Jacobsen, Lijnders, & Robinson, supra note 4, at 4.
10 For complete details on state repression and indefinite conscription in Eritrea, see
Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea (2009),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/eritrea0409web_0.pdf.
I UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of
Asylum-Seekers from Eritrea 11 (2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dafe0ec2.
html.
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dollars per month), and, in the case of female conscripts, are subject to
relentless sexual abuse by commanding officers. 12
Many Eritreans lack basic legal rights. Residents are routinely
subject to imprisonment without explanation, trial, or any form of due
process. These terms of imprisonment often last indefinitely. Most
basic human rights guarantees are restricted. Since 2001, no indepen-
dent press has existed within Eritrea, and all domestic media is
controlled by the government.13 The Isaias government acknowledges
a right to exist for four "recognized" religious groups- the Orthodox
Church, Sunni Islam, Roman Catholicism, and the Evangelical
(Lutheran) Church. Those that do not affiliate themselves with one of
the four recognized religions face arrest and torture that the govern-
ment uses to compel them to recant their faith.14
In Sudan, citizens face equally heavy repression and fear for
their safety, especially within the conflicted region of Darfur, where
civil war and genocide has taken place since 2003. Within 29 months,
350,000 to 400,000 people were killed by means of violence, malnutri-
tion, and disease. The groups targeted most in the genocide include
non-Arab or African tribal groups, primarily the Fur, the Massaleit,
and the Zaghawa, and, to a lesser extent, the Tunjur, the Birgid, the
Dajo, and others. They have fallen victim to Arab militia raids on their
villages while the National Islamic Front, the controlling regime of
Sudan, sits idly by.15 This genocide remains separate from the atrocities
that occurred in southern Sudan before that portion of the country
became an autonomous state in 2005 and attained its independence in
2011. The situation in Darfur alone has led to the exile of over one
million refugees,16 while claiming the lives of over 400,000, and
displacing a total of over 2,500,000 people.17 The citizens of Sudan also
12 Eritrea, supra note 7.
13 id.
14  d.
15 See Eric Reeves, Genocide in Darfur - How the Horror Began, SUDAN TRIBUNE,
September 3, 2005, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?articlel 1445.
16 Brendan Koerner, Who are the Janiaweed?: A Guide to the Sudanese Militamen,
SLATE, July 19, 2005, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/
explainer/2004/07/who are the janjaweed.html.
17 United Human Rights Council: Genocide in Darfur, http://www.
unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm (last visited March 12, 2014)
[hereinafter Genocide in Darfur]. As of April 2014, the situation in Darfur continues.
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face basic human rights violations. The government infringes on rights
to speech and assembly by cracking down on protests.18 Sudanese
residents also face constant political repression and media restrictions.
Those who are perceived to have ties to targeted opposition parties are
detained, regardless of whether ties are real or not. Authorities censor
articles, confiscate newspaper editions, and blacklist journalists for
reporting on sensitive topics.19
Somalia, the largest country of origin for asylum seekers in
Malta, has been subject to a long-running armed conflict that leaves
civilians dead, wounded, and displaced in large numbers. 20 While the
Islamist armed group al-Shabaab remains in control, al-Shabaab and
the forces against it continue to commit abuses, including indiscrimi-
nate attacks and arbitrary arrests and detentions. 21 Al-Shabaab is
notorious for administering arbitrary justice and imposing harsh
restrictions on basic rights.22
Some authors have suggested that asylum seekers from Darfur
be granted special treatment from other refugees, including those from
Eritrea and Somalia.23 For the purposes of this article, refugees from
Eritrea, Somalia, and all regions of Sudan will be examined collectively
under the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
to which Israel and Malta are signatories. This article does not seek to
assess the validity of the individual claims of asylum seekers from each
country. It does appear, however, that there is indisputable evidence
that most, if not all, have some legitimate claim after leaving these
regions.
The international community is often criticized for its lack of efficient response to the
crisis. See Tess Finch-Lees, The International Response to the Continuing Genocide in
Darfur is marred by Indifference and Incompetency, THE INDEPENDENT, April 12,
2014, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-international-response-to-
the-continuing-genocide-in-darfur-is-marred-by-indifference-and-incompetence-
9255320.html.
1s Genocide in Darfur, supra note 17.
19 Id.




23 Holly Buchanan, Escape from Darfur: Why Israel Needs to Adopt a Comprehensive
Domestic Refugee Law, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 601, 603 (2008).
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II. THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
Under the terms of the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter referred to as the Con-
vention), a refugee is defined as "any person who ... owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."24 The
original Convention protected refugees that emerged in Europe prior to
January 1, 1951, as a result of displacement during World War II. The
subsequent 1967 Protocol removed the previous geographical and time
limits that were part of the 1951 Convention.25 As of April 1, 2011, there
are 147 signatories to the either the Convention, Protocol, or both.26
The Convention and Protocol list several grounds under which
the refugee can no longer claim protection. This includes voluntarily
re-availing himself of the protection of the country of his nationality,
re-acquiring his nationality, the ability to return to the country of his
nationality because the conditions that led to his refugee status has
ceased, and acquiring a new nationality in a third country.27 Persons of
whom there are serious reasons to suspect that they have committed a
crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity or a serious
non-political crime outside their country of refuge, or are guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, will be
excluded from protection.28 Further, there is an important distinction
between asylum seekers, refugees, and economic migrants for
purposes of establishing protection under the terms of the Convention.
"Asylum seekers are people who have moved across international
24 UNHCR Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1,
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aalO.html [hereinafter Convention].
25 UNHCR Convention and Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees, Frequently Asked
Questions 1, http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html [hereinafter Convention FAQ].
26 States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
1967 Protocol, http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html (last visited March 13, 2014)
[hereinafter States Parties].
27 Convention, supra note 24, at art. IC.
28Id
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borders in search of protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention,
but whose claim for refugee status have not yet been determined."29
In contrast, economic migrants are motivated by employment
opportunities and other economic and general considerations that may
only be available outside their nation's borders.30 In sum, asylum
seekers are those in the process of acquiring protection under the Con-
vention, refugees are those that have already acquired protection
outside their home countries under the auspices of the UNHCR, and
economic migrants are those who may be motivated either in part or
wholly by reasons other than the need to protect themselves from
death or serious bodily harm. Economic migrants, because they do not
fit the Convention criteria in regard to the bases of persecution, will be
denied protections under the Convention.
The protections given to the refugees afforded protection
under the Convention are abundant. These include the right not to be
expelled except under certain, strictly defined conditions (Article 32);
the right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a
contracting State (Article 31); the right to work (Articles 17 to 19); the
right to housing (Article 21); the right to education (Article 22); the
right to public relief and assistance (Article 23); the right to freedom of
religion (Article 4); the right to access the courts (Article 16); the right
to freedom of movement within the territory (Article 26); and the right
to be issued identity and travel documents (Articles 27 and 28).31
However, the most important protection afforded the refugees, and the
self-avowed cornerstone of the Convention, is the principle of non-
refoulement, contained in Article 33. According to this principle, "a
refugee should not be returned to a country where he or she faces
serious threats to his or her life or freedom."32 The protected refugee
may not be returned to either his home country where he faces perse-
cution or a third country where the refugee faces a risk either of
persecution or of forcible return to the state of origin.
The extent to which these protections are provided vary with
each and every refugee. This is because a state may deny the indivi-
29 David A. Martin et al., Forced Migration: Law and Policy 9 (2007).
30 Avi Perry, Solving Israel's African Refugee Crisis, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 157, 159 (Fall
2010).
31 Convention, supra note 24.
32 Convention FAQ, supra note 25, at 4.
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dual refugee the protection of non-refoulement if it deems that individu-
al, based on reasonable grounds or having been previously convicted
of a particularly serious crime, a danger to the security of the country.33
Refugees upon arrival are guaranteed certain rights as their claims are
pending, including the right to be protected from refoulement.34 The
extent to which these protections have been given to the refugees by
Israel and Malta will be explored later in this article, including the
grounds which Israel and Malta have cited as to why they have denied
most asylum seekers rights under the Convention.
III. THE HISTORY OF REFUGEES IN ISRAEL
Israel's foundation was a response to the persecution of Jews
dispersed all over the world. Against the context of atrocities that
claimed the lives of nearly six million Jews in the Holocaust, where
Jews were persecuted simply for what the Nazis called their race, Israel
was established as a home where Jews may reside without facing reli-
gious or racial persecution. The Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel reflects such a view, stating "After being forcibly exiled
from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their disper-
sion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the
restoration in it of their political freedom.... This right [to a Jewish
homeland] is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of
their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State."35 Its
dedication to being a state for Jews free from persecution has guided
the nation since its inception. In comparison to its history assisting
Jewish refugees, Israel's history with non-Jewish refugees has practic-
ally been non-existent prior to the current waves of African migration.
There have been three notable, though minor, occasions during Israel's
history where it welcomed non-Jewish refugees. The first occurred in
the 1970's, when Israel agreed to accept several dozen Vietnamese
33 Convention, supra note 24, at Article 33. Sudan is considered an enemy of the State
of Israel, and Israel cites this Article as part of its justification of denying proper
treatment of asylum applications for Sudanese refugees.
34 Convention FAQ, supra note 25, at 4.
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refugees who were rescued in open seas. The other two occasions
involved rescuing roughly one hundred Bosnian refugees in 1993 and
a similar number of Albanian Muslim refugees in 1999. However, these
three occasions represent the exception rather than the rule in the
context of Israeli immigration.36 It is also notable that in all three
previous occasions the refugees were abroad under U.N. Supervision
rather than asylum seekers at the border or inside Israel.
The rise in African refugees seeking asylum in Israel is a fairly
recent phenomenon, beginning in 2005. Most of these hailed from the
Darfur region, having left in response to the atrocities being committed
during the country's civil war. In response to the sudden migration
into Israel, the Knesset (Israel's parliamentary body) re-enacted the
seldom-used Prevention of Infiltration Law, which had originally gone
into effect in 1954 to combat the illegal entry of former Arab residents
into Israel from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan,
Iraq, Yemen, or any part of Palestine that lies outside of Israel.37 The
law, enacted in 2011,38 authorized the detention of these infiltrators,
with penalties varying based on the purpose of the infiltration and
whether or not the infiltrator is a repeat offender. 39 Perhaps most
notable among the re-enactment's provisions is the fact that it lacks
any sort of quasi-judicial review guarantee,40 which is in clear contra-
vention of the 1951 Convention.41 It is important to note the intent of
the Prevention of Infiltration Law in attempting to put it in the right
context. The law sought to protect Israel from any infiltrator (mistanen
in Hebrew) who sought "to cause death or serious injury to a
person,"42 though the law was wielded against Palestinians who had
36 Perry, supra note 30, at 165.
37 Prevention of Infiltration Law, 5714-1954, 16 SH 160 (1954) (Isr.).
38 Rebecca Anna Stoil, Anti-Infiltrator Law Passes First Reading in Knesset,
JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 30, 2011, available at http://www.jpost.com/National-
News/Anti-infiltrator-law-passes-first-reading-in-Knesset.
39 Prevention of Infiltration Law, supra note 37.
40 Refugees' Rights Forum: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Israel: February 2009
Update, http://www.acri.org.il/pdf/refugees0209en.pdf (last visited March 12, 2014)
[hereinafter Refugees' Rights Forum].
41 Israel became a signatory to the 1951 Convention on October 1, 1954, and a
signatory to the Protocol on June 14, 1968. States Parties, supra note 26.
42 Yaron, Hasimshony-Yaffe, & Campbell, supra note 3, at 2.
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left what became Israel during the 1948-49 War and who now
attempted to sneak back into their properties.
In 2007, as the numbers of African asylum seekers grew
steadily, Israel began turning to more alternatives in their treatment.
For the first time, many of the Sudanese were relocated to the southern
city of Eilat, finding work predominantly in hotels in the city. Other
asylum seekers were simply brought to the cities of Beersheva and Tel
Aviv. The African Refugees Development Center rented bomb shelters
in Tel Aviv for the asylum seekers. 43 Such actions by the individual
cities in their treatment of the asylum seekers reflect their need to deal
with the immediate consequences of national policy.
Perhaps no more important development occurred in 2007
than the institution of the "Hot Return" policy brokered between Israel
and Egypt. The policy sought to combat the growing number of
asylum seekers entering Israel through the Sinai region of Egypt.44
Under the policy, the Israeli army was entitled to return to Egypt
asylum seekers caught within the first twenty-four hours and within
fifty kilometers of the Egyptian border.45 Such a policy once again
drew the ire of the United Nations as it was claimed to be a violation of
the Convention because in many instances, the Israeli soldiers
detaining the migrants deprived the migrants of due process and
returned them to Egypt without further investigation. For Israel, this
was viewed as a rejection at the border, despite the fact no inquiry was
involved, rather than summary deportation, and therefore defended
such actions as a means of securing its borders. 46 As a result of the
"Hot Return" policy, on at least one occasion alone, fifty Sudanese
refugees from Darfur were deported directly back to Egypt upon
43 Refugees' Rights Forum, supra note 40.
44 Tally Kritzman-Amir & Thomas Spijkerboer, On the Morality of Borders: Border
Policies andAsylum Seekers, 26 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 28-37 (Spring 2013).
45 For a full policy determination of the Hot Return policy, see Egyptian Efforts to
Combat Trespassing Across the International Borders with Israel, Arab Republic of
Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Ministry/News/
Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-ee26ce851de8&newslD=
4543900f-fd9b-446e-9clf-ae66ae726eb5 (last visited March 12, 2014).
46 Kritzman-Amir & Spijkerboer, supra note 4, at 29.
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entering Israel.47 Israel argues that they are entitled to send these
asylum seekers back to their first country of refuge - in this case, Egypt
- and that it has had assurances from the Egyptian Government that
those fleeing will not be harmed or returned to Sudan.48 Of note, Egypt
became a signatory to both the Convention and Protocol on May 22,
1981.49 However, at least one high ranking member of the Egyptian
police told the Associated Press that Egypt would send the Sudanese
back to Sudan, and that there were no assurances sought by Israel
regarding their safety, Israel having simply stated "please take
them."50 For these and others who have been turned over back to
Egyptian authorities, there is a genuine fear for their lives, especially
given the recent period of violent instability. Depending on how well-
founded these fears of persecution in Egypt are, deporting asylum
seekers to a third country is as much a violation of the non-refoule-
ment doctrine espoused in the Convention as if it were a deportation
back to their home nation. This move led at least one leading Israeli
human rights organization, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, to
strongly condemn the government's decision to deport these refugees
"without following the internationally recognized procedures for
determining whether they are refugees."51 Under the Convention, such
an action by Israel is a violation of two separate obligations: not to
deport asylum seekers for exercising their rights under the Convention
and to provide asylum seekers rights to individual hearings. More
recently, Israel began sending asylum seekers to Rwanda and Uganda
under their voluntary departure program without first determining
their asylum status, continuing their violations under the Convention
and Protocol.52
47 Ed O'Laughlin, Israel Starts Driving Refugees From Darfur Horror Back into
Egypt; Holocaust Legacy Invoked in Protest, THE AGE (Melbourne, Australia), Aug.
21, 2007, at 9.
48 Id
49 States Parties, supra note 26.
5 0 O'Laughlin, supra note 47.
51 Isabel Kershner, Israel Policy Sends Darfur Refugees to Egypt, THE INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 21, 2007, at 8.
52 Israel maintains that the asylum seekers leave voluntarily. However, asylum seekers
are left no choice due to the treatment they receive, which is explained in further detail
later in this article. The asylum seekers, upon leaving Israel, arrive in Rwanda and
Uganda with no arranged status, are not granted basic rights, and do not have any
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By the end of 2007, an additional 5,703 asylum seekers entered
Israel, mainly from Sudan, Eritrea, and the Ivory Coast. While some
were detained upon arrival and subsequently released on restrictive
conditions, others were released unconditionally immediately on
arrival due to the lack of prison space. Meanwhile, about one thousand
asylum seekers lived in crowded conditions in the bomb shelters
previously reserved by the African Refugees Development Center. For
the first time, some of the Sudanese citizens were able to acquire work
upon procuring documentation from the United Nations, and were to
begin to live independently, which established the fact that Israel may
have been originally receptive to the applications of asylum seekers.53
In September 2007, Israeli Interior Minister Meir Sheetrit even went so
far as to announce that Israel would offer between 300 and 500
refugees from Darfur citizenship in an unprecedented move.54 Perhaps
it was due to its previous experiences with the temporary waves of
immigration from Vietnam, Albania, and Bosnia, that Israel had
expected the present wave of migrants to end early. "Israel, with its
history, must offer assistance," Mr. Sheetrit told activists during the
announcement. "It can't stand by and shut its eyes. But a quota must
be set."55 Unfortunately, as shall be seen, this has been far from the
norm for the African migrants residing within Israel. Based on figures
to be explained later, perhaps the quota was set too low and too early
on given this most recent wave of African refugees entering Israel.
In May 2008, the Knesset passed the amended version of the
Prevention of Infiltration Law at its first reading, formalizing the "Hot
Return" procedure and permitting the deportation of refugees to
Egypt.56 The amended law immediately drew the ire of the interna-
tional community, most notably from leading human rights organiza-
tions such as Anmesty International, which stated:
official documents or permits. Ilan Lior, Israel is Sending Asylum Seekers to Rwanda
Without Status, Rights, HA'ARETz, Apr. 4, 2014, available at http://www.haaretz.com/
news/national/.premium- 1.583764.
53 Refugees' Rights Forum, supra note 40.
54 Ilene R. Pusher, Israel to Grant Darfur Refugees Citizenship, CHRISTLIN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Sept. 6, 2007, at World 5.
5 5 Id.56 Refugees' Rights Forum, supra note 40.
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The proposed criminalization of irregular entry,
without taking into account the reasons for entry or the
risk of removal, severely restricts the ability of indivi-
duals coming into Israel irregularly from seeking
asylum and potentially criminalizes those who seek
protection from persecution. The draft law also fails to
protect the right of non-refoulement, as required under
international treaties to which Israel is a State Party.57
Further concerns of Amnesty International included the fact that the
law favors the automatic detention of non-nationals who enter Israel
irregularly; fails to provide adequate procedural guarantees to detain-
ees facing deportation; severely restricts the ability of the detainee to
challenge their expulsion; and effectively removes the ability of
individuals to seek international protection in Israel.58
Three years later, in 2011, the Knesset proposed further
amendments to the Prevention of Infiltration Law. Proposed amend-
ments included a minimum three-year prison sentence for illegal
entrants, including their children. Further, the amendments provided
for a five-year prison term for those offering to assist or provide aid to
refugees. Once again, the declared purpose of the amendment was to
deter asylum seekers.59 The amendments were resoundingly passed by
the Israeli parliament in January 10, 2012, drawing immediate backlash
from the international community, including the Human Rights
Watch. "Israeli officials are not only adding rhetorical fuel to the
xenophobic fire, but they now have a new law that punishes refugees
in violation of international law. The law should be amended
immediately, and not enforced until necessary revisions are made,"
stated Bill Frelick, Refugee Program Director.60 By treating all irregular
border-crossers as infiltrators and handing down mandatory prison
57 Memorandum Concerning the Proposed "Prevention of Infiltration Law - 2008",




59 Jillian Kestler-d'Amours, Citizens Flee from Dictatorship to Detention, INTER PRESS
SERVICE (Johannesburg, South Africa), Nov. 30, 2011.
60 Israel: Amend Anti-Infiltration' Law, Human Rights Watch, June 10, 2012,
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/10/israel-amend-anti-infiltration-law.
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sentences, Human Rights Watch argues Israel is in direct contravention
of the Convention and Protocol to which it is a signatory.
In mid-2013, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that a "population of concern" of 56,549
resided in Israel. This included 48,325 refugees, 7,889 asylum seekers,
and 14 stateless persons.61 According to a more recent report concen-
trating solely on Eritreans and Sudanese, roughly 35,895 Eritreans and
15,210 Sudanese reside in Israel.62 2013 also saw the proposal for an
agreement between Israel and an unnamed third country to deport
thousands of African migrants presently in Israel. Critics immediately
denounced the deal as an abdication of responsibility by Israel and
asserting that Israel will not be able to "properly monitor the migrants'
conditions once they are deported."63 It later emerged that Uganda
was the third country that would accept the African migrants. 64
IV. THE PRESENT STATUS OF REFUGEES IN ISRAEL
Refugees from Sudan and Eritrea have a difficult time assimila-
ting in Israel. There is often a stigma that is attached to these asylum
seekers, prompting national concern and outrage from the local
citizens of the major cities. Of the estimated 60,000 asylum seekers
within Israel's borders, most have been given renewable visas,65 but
are denied the right to work and are excluded from the benefit of any
61 2014 UNHCR Regional Operations Profile - Middle East: Israel, http://www.unhcr.
org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e4864b6# (last visited March 12, 2014).
62 P.J. Tobia, Unpromised Land, PBS Newshour, June 20, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/spc/unpromised-land/ (last visited March 12, 2014).
63 Max J. Rosenthal, Israel to Send African Migrants to Third Country, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 3, 2013, available at http://news.yahoo.com/israel-send-african-migrants-
third-country- 144541107.html.
64 Israel to Deport African Migrants to Uganda: Report, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE-
ENGLISH, Aug. 30, 2013.
65 Asylum seekers are given (2)A(5) visas, which serve to only protect them from
deportation. They do not constitute a work permit and does not grant social benefits
and non-emergency medical treatment. HIAS Israel: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in
Israel: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.hias.org.il/pdf/FAQ-s-Asylum-in-
Israel.aspx (last visited April 8, 2014) [hereinafter HIAS Israel].
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social services aside from schooling for their children.66 It is estimated
that approximately 2,500 asylum seekers are held in detention in Israel
at any time, primarily in the Ktziot and Givon detention facilities. 67
The majority of African asylum seekers not in detention reside in South
Tel Aviv, an area known for low-income housing where they compete
with other low-income residents for employment. 68 These migrants are
said to come within the ambit of a "temporary group protection."69
Due to a lack of rights afforded to those falling within the temporary
group protection status, many leading experts have referred to this
type of protection as "weak," which has left most refugees vulnerable
to frequent changes of policies and a lack of stability.70 The grant of
temporary residence to a group of asylum seekers, based solely on the
date of their entry into the country, contravenes Israel's obligations to
put into place procedures to assess individual applications and is
deeply problematic.71 The only thing preventing these refugees from
further embroilment are protection papers handed to them by the
UNHCR, which are often, though not always, respected as proof of a
person's needs for protection, and will only occasionally make them
vulnerable to mass detentions and small-scale deportations. 72 Most
seek work in low income sectors, usually in restaurants and hotels.
Originally, Prime Minister Netanyahu had stated that he would not
prosecute employers who hire these refugees,73 but with the
66 Patrick Martin, African Migrants Influx to Israel Sparks Race Riots; Citizens Worry
Asylum-Seekers Could Become Permanent Residents and Stretch Limited Resources,
GLOBE AND MAIL, June 4, 2012 [hereinafter Martin, African Migrants].
67 HIAS Israel, supra note 65. This number referred to the number held in closed
detention centers prior to the overturning of Amendment No. 3 to the Prevention
Infiltration Law. The Holot open detention center has since opened, which can house
over 3,000 detainees. As of January 2014, fewer than a thousand asylum seekers were
in the center.
68 HIAS: Asylum Seekers in Israel, http://www.hias.org/en/pages/asylum-israel (last
visited April 16, 2014).
69 Tally Kritzman-Amir, Otherness as the Underlying Principle in Israel's Asylum
Regime, 42 ISR. L. REv. 603, 616 (2009).
70 Id. at 616-17.
71 Yaron, Hasimshony-Yaffe, & Campbell, supra note 3, at 2.
72 Kritzman-Amir, supra note 69, at 617.
73 Martin, African Migrants, supra note 66.
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implementation of a newer amendment, the government has
inaugurated a reversal of policy regarding employers. 74
Once refugees cross the border, they deal with further scrutiny
and prejudice from the local citizenry- and the Israelis may have some
well-founded concerns. For many, the notion of a Jewish state is not a
theory, but rather a way of life, providing justification for not accepting
foreigners of any kind into their midst. Some residents are concerned
about a lawless society that may ensue, as some view the African
migrants as having "no care about the law at all."75 There are con-
flicting reports as to the effect the African refugees have on crime rates.
By one account, the asylum seekers are involved in "some 40 percent
of the crimes committed in the Tel Aviv," but according to at least one
other account, "[1]ess than 1 percent of criminal files opened by police
in Tel Aviv in 2010 were against Africans." 76 Considering the popula-
tion of Israel in July 2013 stood at approximately 7,707,000,77 and the
number of African migrants at that time in Israel numbered approxi-
mately 50,000, even the one percent estimate may represent a relatively
high number crimes per capita among the African refugees. Official
statistics reported by Israeli police state that in 2011 it opened 1,200
criminal files against African infiltrators for felonies, and the number
nearly doubled in 2012, including 100 sex offenses.78
Since the completion of most of the border along Egypt in
January 2013,79 the entrance of refugees from Eritrea and Sudan has
come to a virtual halt.80 The fence, erected along the 140 mile border
Israel shares with Egypt, took approximately two years to complete
74 Illegal Immigrants Threaten Israel's Economy, Security: PM, XINHUA GENERAL
NEws SERVICE, Dec. 4, 2011, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/
2011-12/05/c_122374216.htm. [hereinafter Illegal Immigrants]
75 Ben Hartman, Hatikva Residents Feel Abandoned by State, Court Ruling,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 18, 2013, at 1.
76 Martin, African Migrants, supra note 66.
Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html (last visited March 12, 2014).
Amotz Asa-El, Into Africa, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 10, 2014, at 15.
79 Batsheva Sobelman, Israel Completes Most of Egypt Border Fence, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/02/world/la-fg-israel-africa-
immigration-20130103.
8 kwo r o zn= [Data on Foreigners in Israel], http://piba.gov.il/PublicationAnd
Tender/ForeignWorkersStat/Documents/foreign-stat_032013.pdf (last visited March
12, 2014) [hereinafter Data on Foreigners].
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and seeks to prevent the "unfettered flow of illegal infiltrators ... [and]
the smuggling of drugs and weapons," according to a statement from
the Defense Ministry, which oversaw the four-hundred million dollar
engineering project.81 According to official Israeli government publica-
tions, 2,752 refugees entered Israel leading up to 2006; this number was
followed by 5,124 refugees in 2007, 8,857 refugees in 2008, 5,259
refugees in 2009, before ballooning to 14,715 in 2010 and 17,298 in
2011.82 In 2012, the final year before the completion of the fence, 10,440
refugees entered Israel.83 As of September 30, 2013, only 36 refugees
entered Israel in 2013, including none in both August and September,
proving the effectiveness of the fence and agreements with Egypt.84 Of
the 53,636 "infiltrators" in Israel as of September 30, 2013, 13,249 hail
from Sudan, along with 35,987 originating in Eritrea.85
V. OVERTURNING OF AMENDMENT No. 3 TO THE PREVENTION OF
INFILTRATION LAW
On September 16, 2013, an extended panel of nine Justices of
the Supreme Court deliberated the constitutionality of the Prevention
of Infiltration Law as it stood amended and held, unanimously, that
the arrangement is unconstitutional because it disproportionately
limited the constitutional right to liberty in Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty.86 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty's stated purpose
is to "protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish a Basic
Law that reflects the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and demo-
cratic state."87 As amended, the Basic Law stated that "Fundamental
human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the
human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all
81 Sobelman, supra note 79.
82 Data on Foreigners, supra note 80.
83 id.
84 Id.
ss The term "infiltrators" is used directly by the Israeli government in their publications
regarding these African refugees. Id.
86 See Summary of the Judgment: HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, Regarding the
Constitutionality of Amendment no. 3 to the Prevention of Infiltration Law, http://
elyon1.court.gov.il/files-eng/12/460/071/b24/12071460.b24.pdf [hereinafter Adam].
87 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, 2086 HC 60 (1992) (Isr.)
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persons are free."88 The court determined that the intent of the
Prevention of Infiltration law as it stood was to deter future infiltrators
from entering Israel, and not to punish any individual asylum seekers.
Therefore, the law acted as a limitation on the individual's dignity as a
person.89 In what could be compared to the strict scrutiny test applied
in the United States, Justice Arbel, writing for the majority, reasoned
that the law as it stood did not employ the narrowest means possible,
or, as Justice Arbel described, least harmful means. "To the extent that
the purpose of the amendment is deterrence, there are considerable
chances that the border fence between Israel and Egypt will be suffi-
cient." 90 Further, imprisoning the infiltrators for a total of three years,
"a long period," serves a critical and disproportionate blow to the
infiltrators' rights.91 Previously, courts of Israel have noted that "the
needs of one group, important as they may be, cannot be satisfied by
limiting the needs and rights of another group in the population." 92
Finally, Justice Arbel espoused the intent of the Jewish state of Israel by
reminding the court of the moral duty to every person, as they are
etched in the basic pattern of the state of Israel as a Jewish and demo-
cratic state.93 Overturning the previous Amendment, the Court then
ordered all African migrants held in mandatory detention be released
immediately, and that individual examination of all those in custody
be completed within a period of 90 days from the day of its
judgment.94
VI. AFTERMATH OF ADAM V. THE KNESSET
Shortly after the decision to strike down Amendment No. 3 to
the Prevention of Infiltration Law, the Knesset passed a new amend-
ment that reduced time of detention without trial from three years to
one, reallocated funds for construction of a new remote detention
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty- Amendment, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454 90
(1994) (Isr.)
89 Adam, supra note 86, at 3.
90 Id. at 4-5.
91 Id. at 5.92 FH 10007/09 Gluten v. The National Labor Court, 29 (2013) (Isr.).
93 Id. at 6.
94 Id. at 1.
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facility, and provided for more officers to deal directly with infiltra-
tors.95 Passed on November 24, 2013, it further provided for an
increased incentive for infiltrators to return to their home country by
increasing their departure incentive to $3,500 from the previous $1,500.
Prime Minister Netanyahu quickly expressed contentment with the
new amendment, stating that
The steps that we unanimously approved today are
proportionate and necessary for maintaining the
Jewish and democratic character of the state, and to
restore Israeli citizens' security while following High
Court guidelines and international law. The new deci-
sions include combined actions designed to encourage
illegal migrants to leave Israel and return to their
countries of origin, increase personal security for resi-
dents of Israel and reduce the presence of migrants in
city centers.96
The new bill was set to cost Israel approximately 440 million
shekels (roughly $125 million).97 Most of this cost stemmed from an
"open" jail for immigrants that was to open in the Negev. 98 For both
humanitarian agencies and asylum seekers, the fear associated with
the "open" detention facility is that it would be confused for a closed
jail- the type of incarceration that had been struck down by the court in
Adam.99 The new holding facility includes lineups and headcounts, and
those held within it are barred from working. Coupled with the fact
that it is run by the Israeli Prison Service led at least MK Michal Rozin
to state that it "sounds awfully like a jail."oo The facility itself is open
95 Onri Efraim, State Ratifies Amendment to Prevention of Infiltration Law, YNET
NEWs, Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4457427,00.html.
96 Id
97 Onri Efraim, New "Infiltration Prevention Bill" to Cost State NIS 440 Million,
YNET NEWs, Nov. 22, 2013, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4456699,00.
html.
9 Onri Efraim, State to Build "Open" Jailfor Migrants Adjacent to Saharonim, YNET
NEws, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4447545,00.html
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during the day but closed during the nighttime,101 including three
mandatory daily roll calls. 102 Although Prime Minister Netanyahu had
previously stated that he would not prosecute Israeli employers of
infiltrators, with the implementation of the new Prevention of Infiltra-
tion law, as well as the open detention facility, the Population, Immi-
gration, and Borders Authority stated it would begin to implement
both fines and indictments against those found illegally employing
African migrants.103 In this new facility, detainees are able to leave, but
are not able to work legally in Israel. Additionally, they must report for
three daily roll calls in the morning, midday, and at night, and are not
able to leave from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., in essence placing great restrictions
on their freedoms. 104 Conversely, the detainees are still allowed to keep
cell phones and wear their own clothes, differentiating the open facility
from the previous jail where they were detained.105 It would appear
that the sole reason the asylum seekers are brought to the open
detention center is that they are refugees.106
The amended bill led to immediate protest by the African
migrant community. The law, which allowed authorities to detain
migrants without valid visas indefinitely, was passed in mid-
December 2013, and by January 5, 2014, more than 300 people had
been arrested. 107 The protests prompted a rare and strongly worded
statement from the United Nations refugee agency, which said that
101 Efraim, State to Build, supra note 98.
102 Ben Hartman, For African Migrants Now Calling It Home, Holot "Open Prison" Is
a Prison All the Same, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 9, 2014, available at http://www.
jpost.com/National-News/For-African-migrants-now-calling-it-home-Holot-open-
prison-is-a-prison-all-the-same-340804. [hereinafter Hartman, For African Migrants]
103 Ben Hartman, Israel to Begin Using "Open" Detention Facility for Migrants,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 12, 2013, available at http://www.jpost.com/National-News/
Israel-to-begin-using-open-detention-facility-for-migrants-334768.
104 Hartman, For African Migrants, supra note 102.
105 Id
106 Robert Tait, Israeli [sic] to Open Migrant 'Detention Centre', THE TELEGRAPH,
Dec. 12, 2013, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middle
east/israel/10513977/Israeli-to-open-migrant-detention-centre.html.
107 Migrants in Israel Protest Law for Detention, Reuters, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 5,
2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/world/middleeast/migrants-in-
israel-protest-law-for-detention.html?_r=0.
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Israel's incarceration of migrants caused "hardship and suffering" and
was "not in line" with the intentions of the 1951 Convention. 108
VII. ASYLUM PROCEDURES IN ISRAEL
For refugees entering Israel, acquiring recognition as a valid
asylum seeker is an arduous task. During the 1970's a delegation of the
UNHCR was established with the role of examining asylum claims,
which would then pass on their recommendations to the Minister of
Interior. 109 In 2001, the Ministry of Justice drafted a new procedure
entitled "The Procedure for Handling Asylum Seekers in Israel,"
which created a hybrid system whereby the examination of an asylum
application was conducted by UNHCR and the final decision was
taken by the Ministry of Interior. 110 In 2008, the gradual process of
handing over the authority to examine asylum applications in Israel
from the UNHCR to the Ministry of Interior began, and by July 2009,
all stages of handling asylum applications had been transferred to the
Ministry of Interior."'
The present asylum procedure requires applicants to apply
within a year of entering Israel or risk having their application
dismissed out of hand.112 A foreign subject arriving at the Ministry of
Interior Population Immigration and Border Authority (hereinafter
referred to as the Border Authority) must submit an application, which
includes both registration and identification components.113 If a
suspicion arises as to the truthfulness of the application, his matter will
be referred to the consideration of a head of a team in the Refugee
Status Determination department. If no suspicion arises, the applicant
10 Id
109 Yonatan Berman, Until Our Hearts are Completely Hardened: Asylum Procedures
in Israel 12 (Shevy Korzen, trans.), http://hotline.org.il/en/publication/until-our-hearts-
are-completely-hardened-asylum-procedures-in-israel/.
110 Id. at 13.
111 Id. at 14-15.
112 State of Israel Ministry of Interior Population Immigration and Border Authority,
Procedure for Handling Political Asylum Seekers in Israel, at la, lb, http://piba.
gov.il/Regulations/Procedure%20for%2OHandling%2OPolitical%20Asylum%2OSeeke
rs%20in%20Israel-en.pdf [hereinafter Procedure for Asylum Seekers in Israel].
113 Id. at 2a
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will immediately undergo a basic interview.114 All interviews, by law,
are to be conducted in the applicant's native language.115 At the con-
clusion of the basic interview, the interviewer will decide, immedi-
ately, whether to refer the applicant to a comprehensive interview or -
if the applicant has failed to establish what is considered a "colorable
claim" - to refer the application to a process of dismissal out of
hand.116 A dismissal out of hand, or a summary removal,1 17 occurs
when "the claim and facts on which the application is based, even if all
of them were to be proven, do not constitute any of the elements set
out in the refugee convention." 118 If the applicant survives another pro-
cess of dismissal, he is then referred to a comprehensive interview.119 It
is at this time the applicant receives, for the first time, paperwork that
can establish a right to legal presence. The applicant receives a license
pursuant to section 2(a)(5) of the Entry into Israel Law, which will be in
effect until the date set for the comprehensive interview. The very
definition of a 2(a)(5) license is a "temporary visitor permit issued to an
individual who resides in Israel illegally and whose deportation has
been ordered - until his departure from Israel or his deportation."120
However, it may be extended as long as necessary until an administra-
tive decision is made. 121 The applicant may be subject to one more
dismissal procedure, but if the applicant completes the comprehensive
interview to the satisfaction of the administrator, his file is then turned
over to the plenum of the advisory committee on refugees to the
Interior Minister.122 The Committee's recommendations are then
referred to the Interior Minister. 123 The Interior Minister alone may
114 Id. at I 3a.
11s Id. at 3b(1).
116 Id. at 3c.
117 Dallal Stevens, Between East and West: the Case ofIsrael in The Global Reach of
European Refugee Law, edited by Helene Lambert, Jane McAdam, Maryellen Fuller-
ton 132, 138 (Helene Lambert, Jane McAdam, & Maryellen Fullerton eds., 2013).
11s Procedure for Asylum Seekers in Israel, supra note 112, at 4a.
119 Id. at 5a.
120 Reuven Ziegler, A Matter of Definition: On 'Infiltrators' and Asylum Seekers' in
Israel, The Israel Democracy Institute, Jan. 26, 2011, http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/
articles/a-matter-of-definition-on-infiltrators-and-asylum-seekers-in-israel.
121 Procedure for Asylum Seekers in Israel, supra note 112, at 5a.
122 Id. at I 7a.
123 Id. at I 7c.
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decide whether it is appropriate to recognize the applicant as a refu-
gee.1 24 Should the Interior Minister decide to recognize him as a
refugee, the Applicant will be granted a residency license of the a/5
type for one year.125 Applicants who are turned away at any point may
apply for reconsideration, but must do so within a two week period. 126
Once an asylum seeker is officially recognized by the state of Israel, he
must apply to the Population Authority Bureau with a request to
extend his license no later than four months prior to the expiry of the
license. The Director may, in his discretion, extend the refugee's
license. The first such extension lasts one year, the second extension
lasts two years, while all other extensions last for three years.127 Finally,
once an asylum seeker has attained such a license, he may submit a
request to be granted residency licenses for his spouse and minor
children. 128
VIII. CRITIQUE OF THE ASYLUM PROCEDURES IN ISRAEL
The Hotline for Migrant Workers, a self-described "non-
partisan, non-profit association that works to protect the rights of
migrant workers and to eradicate the trafficking of human beings in
Israel," published a report in 2011, in the wake of the passage and
introduction of the latest asylum procedures, regarding the inherent
flaws in the asylum procedures in Israel.129 The inherent flaw in the
asylum procedure lies with the intrinsic attitude Israeli officials have
towards asylum seekers. In mid-June 2009, then-Head of the Popula-
tion, Immigration, and Borders Authority, Yaakov Ganot, declared that
"[i]n our examinations, I would say that 99.9 percent of them are here
for work. They're not asylum seekers, they are not at any risk."130 It is
evident that an undercurrent of hostility towards asylum seekers has
pervaded the relevant governmental departments, which has led to the
124 Id. at I 7d.
125 Id. at I 7f.
126 Id. at 9a.
127 Id. at I1d.
128 Id. at 12a.
129 Berman, supra note 109.
130 Nurit Wurgaft, Closing the Holes and the Loopholes, HA'ARETz, 21 June 2009,
available at http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/closing- the-holes-and- the-
loopholes- 1.278503.
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risk of a "trickle down" effect to the employees examining the appli-
cations.131
The Ministry of Interior refuses to conduct individual examina-
tions of asylum applications made by nationals of Eritrea and Sudan.
Instead, a person claiming to be a national of either country undergoes
an identification interview, but does not undergo the basic or the com-
prehensive interview. The asylum applicant is then given temporary
group protection, which is effectively the implementation of a policy of
non-refoulement for the time being.132 Those claiming to be nationals
of either country are not given any opportunity to present arguments
pertaining to their individual claims. Further, the one year limit on
applications poses a substantial risk of asylum seekers losing their
eligibility for asylum. However, many of these applicants submit
applications after the year-long limit due to various reasons, including,
but not limited to, fear of authorities, being unaware of their right to
protection, or being unaware of the proper asylum procedure.133
The Hotline for Migrant Workers have identified several defi-
ciencies once an asylum seeker actually makes it to the application
stage. The procedure for summary dismissal, or dismissal out of hand,
also poses major problems in the asylum procedure, notably the fact
that a short and basic interview will not reveal the fact that the asylum
seeker has grounds for protection under the Refugee Convention.134
Presently, the Entry to Israel Law is silent about the rights afforded
under the 2(a)(5) permit, thereby frustrating the purpose of granting
the asylum seekers the rights they are afforded under the Conven-
tion.135 Additionally, the unit in charge of the asylum procedure is not
required to disclose the information used in rejecting an asylum
application, which is unlawful according to present Israeli case law
when the level of interest of the person requesting the information
carries significant weight, such as in the case of an asylum seeker. 136
Additional problems arise in section 10 of the asylum procedure,
131 Berman, supra note 109, at 8.
132 Id. at 9.
133 Id. at 18.
134 Id. at 21.
135 Id. at 23.
136 Id. at 24, citing to AdminA 9135/03 The Council for Higher Education v. Ha'aretz
Newspaper Publishing, 60(4) PD 217 [2004] (Isr.).
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which states that the State of Israel reserves the right not to absorb into
Israel and not to grant permits to stay in Israel to subjects of enemy or
hostile states.137 This is especially problematic for asylum seekers from
Sudan, as Israel presently has no diplomatic ties with the country,
which is in direct contravention of Article 1(1) of the Convention (pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of national or ethnic origin).138
Significant issues also arise due to the strict 72 hour time limit that
applicants whose procedure has been rejected out of hand endure.
Asylum seekers who receive a rejection letter are unable to exercise
their rights to appeal within this 72 hour period. Finally, the procedure
does not explicitly reference the non-refoulement principle espoused
under the Convention, albeit the fact that the High Court of Justice in
Israel has ruled that the principle of non-refoulement applies not only
to successful asylum applicants, but to all persons in Israel who risk
being returned to a place where their life or liberty is threatened.139 In
practice, problems persist in the interview methods, methods
employed to assess credibility, limits on research and information on
country of origin, inadequate rejection letters, insufficient summary
evaluations, and problems in translation.140
The issues underlying the asylum system begin with the inter-
viewing methods and last through rejection and its aftermath. During
the interview process, the underlying assumption is that the applicant is
lying, and that the aim of the process is to uncover these lies. 1 4 1 The
interviews extend for long hours, as they focus on peripheral matters
and insignificant and marginal details that no person can be expected to
remember. Every mistake or lapse of memory is attributed to lack of
credibility, which consequently justifies rejecting the asylum claim.14 2
137 Procedure for Asylum Seekers in Israel, supra note 112, at 10. The United States
outlines its regulations for asylum procedure in the Immigration and Nationality Act
§208, and makes a specific reference to the banning of non-refoulement in § 241(b)(3).
United States asylum policy will be referenced throughout this article due to it being
the author's residence. Additionally, the United States is known for being modal in
immigration policy and its rather comprehensive immigration policy, and is therefore
worth noting for its policies.
138 Convention, supra note 24, at Art. 1(1).
139 HCJ 4702/94 Al-Tai v. Minister ofthe Interior, 49(3) PD 843, 848 [1995] (Isr.).
140 Berman, supra note 109, at 28-51.
141 Id. at 28.
142 Id. at 30.
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The Questioning and Identification unit, responsible for the basic inter-
views, is not in any way supposed to ascertain whether the asylum
seeker is credible, but to work on the assumption that the applicant's
statements are true. Nevertheless, many applications are dismissed out
of hand after the Questioning and Identification unit determines that the
asylum seeker is not credible.143 Once rejected, the rejection letters
usually do not allow the asylum seekers to understand the full consi-
derations for rejecting the application.144 Additionally, any mistake in
translation may lead to the rejection of an asylum claim. 145
The limited resources available to migrants also poses a major
problem. Despite the fact that migrants have the right to assistance of
counsel under the asylum procedures in Israel, very few, if any,
actually receive legal aid.146 The Hotline for Migrant workers and the
Tel Aviv University law clinic, established in 2002, provide two of the
few legal resources for asylum seekers. 147 The Tel Aviv University law
clinic, established in 2002, also provides legal assistance to refugees
and asylum-seekers. 148 Simply put, due to the lack of legal resources
available to migrants, they are not able to fully pursue the limited
rights available to them under the law.
The vast majority of asylum claims are not assessed, including,
most notably, the group granted temporary protection status. 149 In
2008-2009 only three individuals out of approximately 3000 cases the
Ministry of the Interior reviewed were granted asylum; from 2010-
2011, the government approved only one claim while rejecting 3,692
other claims.150 According to the UNHCR, of 2,243 decisions made
regarding asylum applications in 2012, only 30 were given a positive
decision, just over 100 of applications, which were all given full Con-
vention protection. 151
143 Id. at 41.
144 Id. at 43.
145 Id. at 48.
146 Yaron, Hasimshony-Yaffe, & Campbell, supra note 3, at 2.
147 Id
148 d
149 Id. at 7.
150 Id
151 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Statistical Yearbook 2012
(2013).
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IX. ISRAEL'S JUSTIFICATIONS IN DENYING HEARINGS TO AFRICAN
REFUGEES
Israel has maintained, facially, that it is committed to the
Convention, and seeking out viable solutions to deal with the African
refugee crisis. At the 2011 United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees Ministerial Meeting, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel
Ayalon echoed such sentiment. Citing Israel's history as a shelter for
Jewish refugees, its role in the Convention, and previous acceptance of
refugees from Vietnam and Darfur, Ayalon reiterated Israel's commit-
ment to the Convention, stating Israel is devoted to
continu[ing] expanding Government capacity and refugee
status determination expertise; [t]o assuming greater
responsibility for refugee status determination; [t]o
reaffirm [Israel's] commitment to the internationally
recognized principle of non-refoulement; [t]o provide the
necessary assistance and medical care to victims of human
trafficking.152
However, Ayalon made it clear he would stop short of most
forms of assistance to the refugees. The foreign minister pointed to
Israel as a "small country," indicating it is unable to accept all illegal
migrants and asylum seekers due its severe implications on "society,
economy, demography, and security."153 This comment, which was
perhaps outweighed by the sheer quantity of comments directed
towards Israel's commitment to assisting the refugees, is perhaps most
revealing of the true Israeli stance towards the African refugees.
Throughout Israel's tumultuous history, one guiding principle
has endured: the idea of a Jewish state, which is embodied in Israel's
Declaration of Independence and Israel's Law of Return- the preemi-
nent 1950 immigration law that allows for the near-automatic citizen-
ship of all Jews wishing to come to Israel as ohm (Jewish immigrants
coming to Israel). "An oleh's visa shall be granted to every Jew who
152 Remarks by Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon at the UNHCR
Ministerial Meeting (As Released by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Location:
Geneva, Switzerland, Federal News Service, Dec. 8, 2011.
153 Id
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has expressed his desire to settle in Israel, unless the Minister of Immi-
gration is satisfied that the applicant" is either engaged in activities
directed against the Jewish people or is likely to endanger the public
health or security of the State.154
"Push-pull" factors are one of the prevailing principles of
immigration law. Simply explained, certain countries have factors that
attract residents of other countries, otherwise known as pull factors.
Meanwhile, negative factors in a resident's home country push resi-
dents out. One of the fears of Israeli ministers is that by relaxing
requirements and accepting larger numbers of refugees through the
Egyptian border will create a "tsunami" of incoming African
migrants.155 In turn, it would create a major pull factor for future
possible African refugees. 156
Another concern for Israel lies in its economy. There is much
anxiety that impoverished African refugees resettled in Israel may
become wards of the state. 157 Israel's experience with the relocation of
Jewish Ethiopians posing persistent socioeconomic problems since the
1980's has caused trepidation among Israeli officials. 158 Today, sixty-
two percent of Ethiopian families live in poverty with no independent
income, including seventy-two percent of Ethiopian children.159 In a
2011 speech, Prime Minister Netanyahu blamed the illegal immigrant
flow on the global economic crisis and regional upheavals.160 It would
appear there is an economic undertone to how the Prime Minister
views the African migrants. Additionally, the Prime Minister
proclaimed he would seek out additional venues to quash the pull of
migration into Israel, most notably seeking out harsher punishments
for employers that hire illegal employees. 161 Most African migrants live
in poor neighborhoods where residents see them as competition under
conditions of scarcity. Explicit racism toward Blacks is also an issue,
15 4 Law of Return, 5710-1950, SH No. 51 p. 15 9 §2(b) (Isr.).
155 Roni Sofer, Olmert: We Must Curb Infiltrations from Egypt, YNET NEWS, Mar. 23,
2008, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3522476,00.html.
156 Perry, supra note 30, at 177.
157 Id
158 Id
19 Id. at 177-78, referencing IAEJ Employment Initiative, Isr. Ass'n for Ethiopian
Jews, http://tinyurl.com/23mgpfv (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
160 Illegal Immigrants, supra note 74.
161 Id
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and many poorer, dark-skinned Israelis of North African descent fear
being undermined by being lumped together with "real" Africans.
X. ASYLEES OR ECONOMIC MIGRANTS?
Another key argument Israeli officials have advanced in their
refusal to accept African asylum seekers is the belief many refugees are
simply economic migrants who seek protections as asylum seekers.
The most recent trend sees African migrants leaving the country. A
total of 1,705 African migrants agreed to leave Israel voluntarily in
February 2014.162 This number follows a steady increase which saw 765
asylum seekers who voluntarily repatriated themselves in January, 325
in December, and 63 in November. 163 Israeli Interior Minister Gideon
Sa'ar credits this exodus to the new anti-infiltration amendment, the
introduction of the "open" detention facility, greater enforcement
against Israelis hiring illegal migrants, and the one-time grant increase
from $1,500 to $3,500 to those who voluntarily depart. 164 It has since
emerged that two African countries, which have remained unidenti-
fied, are willing to accept the asylum seekers. 165 Those leaving include
asylum seekers who are brought directly from the closed detention
center in Saharonim, which has been said by the United Nations to
indicate that they are not acting out of free will. 166
For some leading commentators, this is simply affirmation that
the Eritreans and Sudanese came to Israel as economic migrants, and
not due to a well-founded fear of persecution. 85 percent of African
migrants coming to Israel are young men, which may be characteristic
of economic migrants.167 The minimum wage in Israel is over 30 times
162 Ben Hartman, Israel Sees Record Number of Asylum Seekers Leave Country in





165 Ilan Lior, Two African Countries Taking in Asylum Seekers Leaving Israel,
HA'ARETZ, Mar. 12, 2014, available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.
premium- 1.579270. [hereinafter Lior, Two African Countries]
166 Id.
167 Yonatan Jakubowitz, Opinion, It's the Money, Stupid, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 18,
2013, at 29.
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the average wage in Eritrea.168 The European Union itself only recog-
nizes 30 o of Eritreans and Sudanese as legitimate asylum seekers, a
paltry number in comparison to those actually claiming asylum. 169
Additionally, all migrants coming to Israel must pass through at least
one other country in which there is an active branch of the UNHCR,
Egypt.170 Article 31 of the UN charter explicitly states that the rights
enumerated in it should be awarded only to refugees who come
directly from the country in which they were being persecuted. 171 Such
is also the sentiment of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has repeatedly
restated his pledge to crack down on the "illegal immigrants flowing
to his country." 172 Netanyahu has stated that he views "the flooding
illegal, job-seeking immigrants as threats to our economy, society,
security and the delicate demographic fabric which Israel is built on....
We are determined to protect our border and our citizens' jobs." 173
Others, including leading activists, believe the combination of
measures put in place against the migrants has reduced some to utter
despair, essentially forcing them to leave the country. 174 For them,
implementation of the latest procedures, especially the opening of the
newest detention center, are "designed to force them into leaving." 175
Regardless of the ultimate determination regarding these migrants,
Israel owes them under the Convention to which it is a signatory, at
the very least, a screening process that determines whether or not they
are, in fact, eligible for asylum protections under the Convention, or
168 Id
169 Yonatan Jakubowitz, Opinion, Illegal Infiltration to Israel: It's the Economy,
Stupid!, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 8, 2014, at 15.
170 Egypt is a signatory to the Convention and Protocol. However, it has not yet
developed national asylum procedures and institutions, the functional responsibilities
for all aspects of registration, documentation, and refugee status determination are
carried out by UNHCR under the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding with the
Government of Egypt. 2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Egypt, http://www.
unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486356.
171 Convention, supra note 24, at Article 31.
172 Illegal Immigrants, supra note 74.
173 Id.
174 Aldo Baquis, Israel: 1700 African Migrants Give Up and Leave; 'Voluntary
Returns' Says Interior Minister; Not So, Says Activist, ANSAMED- ENGLISH, Feb. 28,
2014, http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2014/02/28/Israel-
1700-African-migrants-give-up-leave_10160725.html.
175 Tait, supra note 106.
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whether they are merely cloaking themselves in the veil of asylum
seekers in order to seek more desirable economic opportunities.
XI. HISTORICAL AND PRESENT STATUS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN MALTA
The tiny Mediterranean nation of Malta became a signatory to
the Convention on June 17, 1971, and became a signatory to the Proto-
col on September 15, 1971.176 Malta lies in a unique position similar to
Israel due its geographical proximity to the origin nations of the at-risk
refugees. Malta, which joined the European Union in 2004, has
become, along with Israel, one of the preferred destinations for refu-
gees leaving the Horn of Africa. The majority of the 65,000 immigrants
crossing the Mediterranean into Europe every year originate from sub-
Saharan Africa.177 Malta rests just 180 miles north of Africa, closer than
any other democratic body of land aside from Israel.178 Many of the
Sub-Saharan refugees depart Africa through Libya, which has been
either unwilling or unable to supervise its long land borders to stop
irregular immigrants from entering the country from sub-Saharan
Africa, and has further been unable to control its extensive coastline. 179
In 2013, 2,008 asylum seekers arrived from Libya via 24 boats, a
slight increase from the 1,890 individuals who arrived by boat in 2012.
This figure was comprised of 50% Somalians and 23% Eritreans. As of
the end of 2013, around 500 individuals remained in detention, and
1,499 asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protections lived in open
centers.180 Approximately 2,025 decisions were made in Malta
regarding asylum applications in 2012, the last year for which final
176 States Parties, supra note 26.
177 Alexander Betts, Towards A Mediterranean Solution? Implications for the Region
of Origin, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 652, 652 (2006).
17s Health and Human Services in Malta, James Madison University, About Malta: It's
an Education and an Adventure in the Middle of the Mediterranean Ocean, September
6, 2008, http://www.iihhs.jmu.edu/malta/about.html
179 Roderick Pace, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 27 the European
Parliament Election in Malta, Eur. Parties Elections and Referendums Network 1, 11
(June 6, 2009), available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/no_27_epernep
2009malta.pdf.
1so Beneficiaries of protection denote individuals who are recognized to have a
colorable claim and are protected from refoulement, but have not been granted
unilateral asylum protection by the state.
296 V_ 21
DIVERGENT PATHS, SIMILAR RESULTS
statistics are available. 181 This number includes 1,590 first instance
decisions, of which 1,435 were positive decisions.182 Only 155 rejections
were made regarding applications of asylum seekers. Of the 1,435
positive decisions made in the first instance, only 35 were afforded full
asylum protection. Of the approximate 435 final, non-first instance
decisions that were made regarding asylum applications, only 20
positive decisions were made. UNHCR estimates that around 30% of
the 18,625 individuals who arrived by boat from Libya since 2002
remain in Malta, while approximately 2,242 beneficiaries of secondary
protection 83 resettled or relocated elsewhere since 2005.184 Although
an influx of asylum seekers numbering approximately 2000 may not
appear to be much, it represents a sizeable portion compared to the
general population of approximately 419,000.185 Comparatively
speaking, it would represent an influx of approximately 2.5 million
extra people to the United Kingdom.186 Over 450,000 asylum
applications were made in Europe in 2013,187 meaning asylum
applications in Malta represented approximately .44% of the total
asylum applications in Europe. Comparatively speaking, the total
European Union population as of January 1, 2014, stood at over 507
million,188 meaning Malta's population represented less than .10% of the
total population in the European Union, the smallest population of any
country in the European Union. Malta's share of asylum applications is
"" European Asylum Statistics, supra note 2.
182 Positive decisions include both full Convention protection and complementary
protection which provides that the applicant cannot be returned to his home country,
but is not afforded asylum status in the country of application.
183 Secondary protection indicates that the asylum seeker received recognition as
having a colorable claim regarding a legitimate fear of persecution in their home
country, but do not receive full asylum protections from the country in which they
applied.
184 UNHCR: 2013 Malta Asylum Trend, http://www.unhcr.org.mt/component/content/
article/722.
185 BBC News: Malta Profile, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- 17597837.
186 Colin Freeman, Malta Drowns under Flood of Immigrants; As the Boats Continue
to Arrive on Its Shores, the Island Issues a Cry for Help, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH,
July 21, 2013, at 25.
187 Over 450,000 Asylum Applications in Europe in 2013, EU OBSERVER, Feb. 5, 2014,
available at http://euobserver.com/tickers/123015.
1ss Europa: Living in the EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index-en.
htm.
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therefore five times greater than its share of the EU population. "Right
now we cannot cope with these numbers, they are unsustainable,"
echoed Malta's Prime Minister, Joseph Muscat. "Malta is the smallest
state in the EU, and we are carrying a burden that is much bigger than
any other country."189 It appears Muscat is endorsing the sentiment
that due to Malta's minute stature, it is incapable of handling the
enlarged influx of refugees. As recently as 2009, Malta had the third
highest relative asylum application rate, behind only Cyprus and
Liechtenstein, averaging 7.806 asylum applications per thousand of
population.190
In its search to cope with the flow of migrants, Malta has, in
the past, considered plans to eject asylum seekers. On July 9, 2013,
Malta was rebuffed by the European Union Court of Human Rights in
its efforts to board 45 would-be refugees under police guard on flights
to Libya.191 Home affairs commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom had
previously been informed that Malta would most likely be in violation
of its non-refoulement obligation if it did not give the asylum seekers the
chance to file asylum requests and give them due consideration prior
to expelling them.192
XII. EUROPEAN UNION REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES CONCERNING
MALTA
Because Malta is a member of the European Union, it is guided
by several regulations and directives that formulate the Common
European Asylum System. According to the European Commission,
the member states "have a shared responsibility to welcome asylum
seekers in a dignified manner, ensuring they are treated fairly and that
their case is examined to uniform standards so that, no matter where
an applicant applies, the outcome will be similar." 193 However, the
189 Freeman, supra note 186.
190 Meher Talib, Numbers Versus Rights: State Responsibility Towards Asylum Seekers
and the Implications for the International Refugee Regime, 27 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 405,
414-15 (Winter 2013).
191 Andrew Rettman, Outrage Over Malta's Plan to Kick Out Asylum Seekers, EU
OBSERVER, July 10, 2013, available at http://euobserver.com/justice/120817.
192 Id
193 A Common European Asylum System, European Commission - MEMO/13/532,
June 12, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO- 13-532_en.htm.
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current system has been criticized as posing a "triple threat" to EU
solidarity by placing a "grossly disproportionate burden on the
southern states," including Malta, "fail[ing] to ensure that member
states adhere to common standards with respect to asylum seekers,"
and "limit[ing] the ability of Frontex, the EU external border control
agency." 194
The first such regulation is the Dublin Regulation, which was
modified in 2003 after its original conception in 1990. The self-avowed
purpose of the Dublin Regulation is "to identify as quickly as possible
the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application,
and to prevent abuse of asylum procedures." 195 Among its guiding
principles is the regulation's view that only one member state is
responsible for examining an asylum application; in essence stating
that asylum seekers should not be sent from one nation to the next nor
should asylum seekers be allowed to apply to numerous countries.196
This is known as asylum shopping, a measure the Dublin Regulation
sought to prevent. The baseline rule states that the first member state
where a refugee applies for asylum becomes the member state's
responsibility, including those member states into which asylum
seekers have crossed illegally. Other criteria may dictate what member
state is responsible for the asylum applicant, including the family
reunion provision (where the asylum seeker has a family member,
regardless of whether the family was previously formed in the country
of origin, who has been allowed to reside as a refugee in a Member
State, that Member State shall be responsible for examining the appli-
cation for asylum, provided that the persons concerned so desire);197
the Member State which granted valid residence document or visa;198
and five months' residency in a different member state, among
194 Lillian M. Langford, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under the Common
European Asylum System and the Unraveling ofEU Solidarity, 26 HARV. HUM. RTs. J.
217, 217-18 (Spring 2013).
195 Council Regulation 343/2003, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for
Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application
Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1
(EC).
196 Id
197 Id. at art. 7 & 8.
198 Id. at art. 9.
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others.199 Perhaps most importantly, the Dublin Regulation states that
the member state designated as responsible for the asylum application
must take charge of the applicant and process the application.200
Under the Dublin II Regulation, there are only two provisions
that allow for the return of an applicant from one Member State to
another. Article 4(5) provides that if an asylum seeker lodges an
application in a second state after withdrawing his or her application
from the first, the applicant shall be returned to the first member state
in which he or she lodged the application.201 Additionally, pursuant to
Article 16, a Member State may also call upon another to take charge of
and take back an applicant who rightfully should be processed there.
Further, the Dublin II Regulation established a "safe third country"
provision, which grants that any Member State has the right to return
an asylum seeker to a third country so long as it is in accordance with
the 1951 Geneva Convention. 202 Due to the many provisions allowing
states to send asylum seekers elsewhere and how they wish to accept
them, it would appear that the Regulation leaves the process
decentralized and in the hands of the Member States to sort out in
accordance with "their own laws and political will." 203
Because the baseline rule provides that the state that receives
the original asylum applicant is responsible for his application and
well-being, the Regulation has been criticized as creating "asymme-
trical obligations for which the northern states have failed to
compensate." 204 This has led the southern states such as Malta to
employ controversial migrant interception measures that "defy ...
human rights and obligations under EU and international law." 205
There are two other regulations and directives handed down
by the European Union that are worth considering. The first, the
199 Id. at art. 10.
200 Id. For examples, see art. 3, 16, 17.
201 Id. at art. 4(5).
202 Id. at art. 3(3). The United States has a similar provision. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Act §241(b)(3).
203 Barry Junker, Burden Sharing or Burden Shifting? Asylum and Expansion of the
European Union, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 301 (2006).
204 Lillian M. Langford, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under the Common
European Asylum System and the Unraveling ofEU Solidarity, 26 HARV. HUM. RTs. J.
217, 218 (Spring 2013).
205 Id
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"Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards on Proce-
dures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee
Status," set out certain minimum standards on timing, as well as pro-
viding for an accelerated asylum application provision for dealing
with manifestly unfounded applications.206 The second, the 2003 Coun-
cil Directive on Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum
Seekers, sought to both afford applicants comparable living conditions
in all member states and also to limit secondary movements.207 This
includes allowing the applicant to stay in the territory of the Member
State during processing, but only to the extent that the Member State
provides them guaranteed access to all benefits under the Directive.208
XIII. MALTA'S DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION & ASYLUM LAWS
While the Dublin II Regulation and other directives provided
by the European Union provide the guidelines for its Member States to
follow, it is up to the individual country to legislate its own asylum
and refugee laws. While Malta does have its own Refugees Act209, it
includes very little regarding asylum procedures and detention. It
does, however, include explicit references to its obligations under the
Dublin II Regulation, which include the right to not be removed from
Malta pending application,210 provides the means for how to deal with
manifestly unfounded applications, 211 and prohibits refoulement,212
among other provisions.213 While the Refugees Act lays out a proce-
206 Proposed Council Directive 578/2000, Proposal for a Council Directive on
Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing
Refugee Status, 2001 O.J. (C 62E), as amended by 2002 O.J. (C 291 E).
207 Council Directive 9/2003, Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of
Asylum Seekers, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18 (EC).
208 Id. at art. 7.
209 Refugees Act, Chapter 420 of the Malta Laws [hereinafter Refugees Act].
210 Id. at art. 10(1): "Not withstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary,
an asylum seeker shall not be removed from Malta before his application is finally
determined in accordance with this Act."
211212 Id. at art. 18(1).
22Id at art. 9(1).
213 The Refugees Act provides varying treatment for asylum seekers and refugees. The
procedure for asylum application is outlined in Article 8, while Article 10 outlines the
rights and treatment afforded to asylum seekers, while the rights and treatments
afforded to recognized refugees are outlined in Article 11.
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dure for handling asylum applications, it still leaves many questions
regarding the treatment of the arrival of an asylum seeker, who enters
Malta, technically speaking, as an illegal entrant. This leaves Malta's
Refugees Act vulnerable to much criticism. Malta uses its Immigration
Act as a guideline for how to deal with all illegal entrants, regardless of
their claims for asylum. Therefore, under the Immigration Act, the
position of asylum-seekers who enter irregularly is identical to that of
any other migrant who enters irregularly.214
While the Refugees Act is supplemented by the Reception of
Asylum Seekers Regulation,215 neither document references specific
procedures for asylum seekers. Asylum seekers who enter illegally and
do not receive clearance for leave from the Principal Immigration Offi-
cer pursuant to Article 5 of the Immigration Act are termed "prohi-
bited migrants," 216 and are therefore treated the same as all other
illegal entrants. Under the Immigration Act, detention is the automatic
consequence of a refusal to grant admission to national territory,217 the
alternate being the issuance of a removal order in respect of a
particular individual.218 Further, the Immigration Act makes no
reference to the concept of non-refoulement, leaving asylum seekers who
are grouped with other illegal entrants at risk of expulsion. The Immi-
gration Act also provides for power to arrest without a warrant any
individual who is in Malta without the required leave from the immi-
gration authorities or who is reasonably suspected of being in Malta
without the authorization of the Principal Immigration Officer. 219 In
practice, the immigration authorities in Malta systematically issue
removal orders to all persons arriving irregularly by boat from Libya,
who constitute the majority of asylum-seekers on the island.220 Further,
illegal entrants against whom a removal order is issued are typically
214 UJNHCR's Position on the Detention of Asylum-Seekers in Malta 4, Sept. 18, 2013,
http://www.unhcr.org.mt/news-and-views/press-releases/698 [hereinafter UNHCR's
Position].
215 Reception of Asylum Seekers (Minimum Standards) Regulations, Chapter 420.06
of the Laws of Malta [hereinafter Reception Regulations].
216 Article 5 of the Immigration Act, Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta [hereinafter
Immigration Act].
217 Id. at art. 10.
218 Id. at art. 14(2).
219 Id. at art. 16.
220 UJNHCR's Position, supra note 214, at 23.
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not informed of the consideration leading to the order, nor are they
given an opportunity to present information or documentation in
support of a request for a period of voluntary departure. 221
Prior to December 2003, Malta had employed a policy of
blanket mandatory and indefinite detention of persons found entering
or staying in Malta in an irregular, or illegal, manner, including asylum
seekers. However, in January 2005, with the adoption of the Irregular
Immigrants, Refugees, and Integration Policy Document, Malta began self-
imposing a maximum period of 18 months in detention, or until a
party's asylum application is processed, whichever occurs sooner.222
However, the 2005 policy document makes no specific reference to
asylum seekers; rather, it continues to treat all irregular migrants the
same way. All illegal entrants, including asylum seekers, retain
remedies to challenge their detention, including remedies under the
Criminal Code, various remedies under the Immigration Act, a
remedy under the EU Returns Directive, and a remedy through
constitutional proceedings. However, as shall be seen, all remedies are
marked by procedural deficiencies, and therefore are not proper for
considering an asylee's rights.
XIV. CRITICISMS OF MALTA'S ASYLUM PROCEDURES
Because detention is automatic for all illegal entrants despite
their claims, Malta is in clear contravention of Article 31 (on non-
penalization of refugees who enter or stay illegally in the country of
refuge) of the 1951 Convention. Article 31 of the Convention espouses
the idea that every refugee shall enjoy the fundamental right to liberty
and security of person. Asylum seekers who enter Malta having not
previously received permission to enter are grouped together with
other illegal entrants and are termed "prohibited migrants," and are
therefore subject to mandatory detention under Article 10 of the
Immigration Act. In practice, asylum seekers remain at the mercy of
the Office of the Refugee Commissioner, subject to release only after
221 Id
222 National Legislative Bodies, Malta: Irregular Immigrants, Refugees and
Integration Policy Document, 2005, http://www.refworld.org/docid/51bl97484.html.
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obtaining a form of protection from the Office.223 The UNHCR has
consistently held that detention is considered arbitrary where there is a
lack of reasonability that would indicate that the detention is propor-
tionate to a legitimate objective.224 Furthermore, failure to consider less
coercive or intrusive means could also render detention arbitrary. 225
Malta's guidelines for detention therefore fail as a matter of being
arbitrary and capricious, as there is no legitimate purpose for the
mandatory detention, nor are alternative measures considered. The
European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that detention
for the purposes of removal should only occur after the asylum claim
has been rejected, and the asylum seeker is subject to proper removal
grounds.226 The only mandatory detention that is permissible under
United Nations guidelines is for a limited initial period for the purpose
of recording, within the context of a preliminary interview, the ele-
ments of their claim. 227 In essence, detention can only be applied for a
legitimate purpose in the individual case. Without such a purpose,
detention will be arbitrary, even if entry was illegal.2 28
Further, asylum seekers in mandatory detention are subject to
harsh and crippling conditions. The UNHCR position paper on the
treatment of asylum seekers in Malta has concluded that " [t]he
negative and at times severe physical and psychological consequences
of detention are well documented, yet appear to have had limited
impact on national policy-making on the detention of asylum-
223 Refugees Act, supra note 209, at Article 8(1). Asylum seekers in Israel also may
receive assistance from the UNHCR, albeit to limited extents. Of the 6,460 pending
asylum applications in Israel at the beginning of 2012, only 765 received assistance
from the UNHCR. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Statistical
Yearbook 2012 (2013).
224 UNHCR Detention Guidelines, 2012, 18, http://www.unhcr.org/505bl0ee9.html
[hereinafter Detention Guidelines].
225 id
226 See Lokpo and Tourd v. Hungary, App. No. 10816/10, ECHR (2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e8ac6652.html.
227 UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion on Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, No.
44 (XXXVII) - 1986, para. (b), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae
68c43cO.html.
228 A v. Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC),
April 3, 1997, para. 9, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b71a0.html.
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seekers." 229 The horrid conditions have led to riots and injuries among
the detainees. 230 While most detention centers were found to have
adequate facilities, the open facilities, which houses refugees, benefi-
ciaries of subsidiary protection, asylum seekers, and persons whose
asylum claims have been rejected, were found to be clearly substan-
dard. 231 The centers all suffered from overcrowding and severely
limited resources. 232 Additionally, vulnerable groups of people (fami-
lies with children, unaccompanied minors, persons with disabilities,
and others) were also subject to mandatory detention. While some of
the more visible of the vulnerable groups were allowed early leave, the
procedure for securing the release of other vulnerable groups took
longer while detention was accordingly prolonged.233
Additionally, Malta's laws relating to asylum seekers violate
the labor protections that asylum seekers receive under both European
law and the Convention. Article 17 of the Convention stipulates that
asylum seekers shall receive "the most favourable treatment accorded
to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards
the right to engage in wage-earning employment" so long as their
claim has not yet been rejected.234 Further, the EU Reception Condi-
tions Directive 2013 stipulates that Member States shall ensure that
applicants have access to the labour market no later than 9 months
from the date when the application for international protection was
229 UJNHCR's Position, supra note 214, at 7. For more detail on the effects of the
harsh conditions as they lead to trauma by the inmates, see Jesuit Refugee Service,
Europe: Becoming Vulnerable in Detention, June 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4ec269f62.html.
230 DetainedMigrants Riot in Aalta, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 25, 2014.
231 Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe,
Report Following His Visit to Aalta from 23 to 25 Alarch 2011, June 9, 2011,
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?Index=no&command=com.instranet.C
mdBlobGet&Instranetlmage=1858117&SecMode=1&Docld=1749792&Usage=2. It is
important to note that when the Commissioner conducted his visit to Malta's facilities,
the influx of migrants fleeing through Libya had not yet occurred. There were only 49




234 Convention, supra note 24, at art. 17.
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made.235 According to Malta's Receptions Regulations, the only guar-
antee made regarding the availability of employment to asylum
seekers is that within 12 months shall the Ministry make a decision
regarding the issuance of employment licenses.236 The Regulations in
no way guarantee that employment eligibility will be secured within
the one year period, as it remains within the discretion of the Ministry
as to whether or not they will be given permission to work.23 7
All detainees have a number of procedural remedies for chal-
lenging their detention, including remedies under the Criminal Code,
various remedies under the Immigration Act, a remedy under the EU
Returns Directive, and a remedy through constitutional proceedings.
This is another area where it can be seen that asylum seekers are
treated the same as all other illegal entrants for administrative and
procedural purposes. Unfortunately, all the remedies contain proce-
dural deficiencies, and therefore are not adequate for considering an
asylum seeker's rights. Under Article 409A of the Criminal Code, a
detained person may seek recourse before the Court of Magistrates
and request it to examine the lawfulness of the detention and order
release from custody.238 However, in the 2004 case of Karim Barboush v.
Commissioner of Police, when an asylum seeker challenged his deten-
tion, it was held that it is not within the competence of the Courts to
examine whether there are other circumstances which could render the
detention illegal. 239 This was due to the fact the Court held that since
there was a national law authorizing detention, which imposes no limit
on the amount of time a person may spend in detention, such deten-
tion is lawful.240
There also remedies available directly under the Immigration
Act, as Article 25A provides an Immigration Appeals Board that has
235 Directive 2013/33/EU, EU Reception Conditions Directive Laying Down Standards
for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection, 2013 OJ (L 180) 96 (EC),
at art. 15. In the United States, applicants are eligible to work 180 days after applying
for asylum. Immigration and Naturalization Act §208(d)(2).
236 Reception Regulations, supra note 215, at art. 10.
237 This power also remains discretionary in the US.
238 Article 409A, Criminal Code, Chapter 9, Laws of Malta [hereinafter Criminal
Code].
239 Karim Barboush v. Commissioner of Police, Criminal Court, Case No. 2/2004,
Chief Justice Vincent De Gaetano (Nov. 5, 2004).
240 Id
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"the jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals or applications in
virtue of the provisions of [the Immigration] Act or regulations made
thereunder or in virtue of any other law."241 Appeals under the Immi-
gration Act fall under three categories: appeals against removal orders,
applications requesting release on the grounds of unreasonableness,
and applications requesting release on bail. However, there is currently
no system in place to ensure that legal aid lawyers visit detention
centers to offer legal services for the purposes of providing access to
legal proceedings to challenge detention.242 Article 25A(9) also pro-
vides that the Immigration Appeals Board has the "jurisdiction to hear
and determine applications made by persons in custody in virtue only
of a deportation or removal order to be released from custody pending
the determination of any application under the Refugees Act of other-
wise pending their deportation."24 3 However, it is important to note
that under Article 25A(10), the Immigration Appeals Board may only
make a decision on the unreasonableness of the detention, not the
legality of the detention, and therefore, appellants under this category
may not challenge the validity of the detention itself.2 44 The third and
final category of appeals under Article 25, applications requesting
release on bail, also presents a number of problems.245 Often times, the
Immigration Appeals Board will set a number of conditions which
most asylum-seekers are unable to fulfill, including bond being set at
around E1000, a sum which they usually cannot afford;246 requiring a
guarantor who would provide subsistence and accommodation; and
prohibiting the person released on bond from working for up to a
241 Immigration Act, supra note 216, at art. 25A(1)(c).
242 UJNHCR's Position, supra note 214, at 46. For more detail on the effects of the
harsh conditions as they lead to trauma by the inmates, see Jesuit Refugee Service,
Europe: Becoming Vulnerable in Detention, June 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4ec269f62.html.
243 Immigration Act, supra note 216, at art. 25A(9).
244 Id. at art. 25A(10). The difference between a detention being unreasonable and
illegal is challenging the conditions of the detention instead of challenging the
detention itself.
245 Id. at art. 25A(6).
246 According to procedure, upon arrival, the immigration authorities confiscate any
money which the detainee may have had with him, further frustrating their ability to
fulfill bond obligations. See UJNHCR's Position, supra note 214, at 53.
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year. 24 7 Asylum seekers also have a remedy under the Returns Regula-
tions, but are essentially precluded from being able to exercise it due to
the fact they arrive by boat.248 The final proceeding asylum seekers
have available is the ability to file an application before the Civil Court
in its Constitutional Jurisdiction, as well as the ability to appeal to the
Constitutional Court. However, the European Court of Human Rights
has consistently held that such a procedure is cumbersome and does
not provide the speedy review necessary for such an application.249 It
would appear all venues offered to asylum seekers to challenge their
detention are faulty or partial, and do not provide the procedural
safeguards asylum seekers need.
XV. AFRICAN REFUGEES AROUND THE WORLD
In order to juxtapose them and to determine whether Israel
and Malta represent anomalies among signatories to the Convention, it
is important to note efforts made around the world in coping with
asylum seekers and refugees. In 2012, according to the UNHCR,
915,023 total decisions were made regarding asylum applications,
including 437,969 rejections, 210,851 applications receiving Convention
protection, and 51,058 applications receiving complementary protec-
tion.250 Complementary protection is a term used to describe asylum
applications who are not refugees as defined within the Convention,
but who cannot be returned to their home country because there is a
real risk that the person will suffer certain types of harm that would
247 Id.
248 Common Standards and Procedures for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country
Nationals Regulations. Subsidiary Legislation 217.12, Legal Notice 81 of 2011 (better
known as the Returns Regulations), Regulation 11(10), gives asylees a cause of action
to institute proceedings before the Board to contest that lawfulness of detention.
However, Regulation 11(1) provides that such special proceedings are not accessible to
asylees "apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with
the irregular crossing by sea or air of the external border of Malta." Id. Due to Malta's
geographical position as an archipelago of three islands in the middle of the
Mediterranean Sea, most asylees are intercepted in such a matter, and are therefore
precluded from exercising their right under the Returns Regulations.
249 See Louled Massoud v. Malta, Application No. 24340/08, European Court of
Human Rights, 27 July 2010, at 20.
250 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Statistical Yearbook 2012
(2013).
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implicate their right to non-refoulement. To broaden the comparison, I
have chosen to mention asylum procedures in Italy (due to its proxi-
mity to Africa and membership in the European Union) and asylum
statistics of Eritreans, Somalians, and Sudanese around the world.
A. Italy
Perhaps no country has drawn more ire in its handling of
asylum seekers than Italy. The nation has received threats from the
European Union's top migration official, Cecilia Malmstrom, that EU
aid to Italy could be at risk because it could not continue to support the
deplorable conditions in its migrant detention centers.251 Italy's deten-
tion centers have been blasted by human rights groups and opposition
politicians as little better than concentration camps. 25 2 Previously, Italy
was forced to transfer migrants from at least one detention center on
the island of Lampedusa which was at the heart of a controversy over
unsanitary conditions and mistreatment.253 The residents of Italy, after
having dealt with thousands of Tunisians after unrest broke out in
their home country, have hosted protests and isolated possible
asylees.254 Italy registered a record of 2,156 migrants in January 2014
alone, which was followed by a period of 1,123 migrants that were
saved through naval operations in the first week of February.255 Italy
(more specifically Lampedusa and Sicily) is now the top destination of
asylum seekers from Africa.
251 Top EU Official Threatens Action over Italy's Treatment of Migrants, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Dec. 18, 2013.
252 Italy Pledges to Improve Conditions at Migrant Detention Centers, UPI, Feb. 6,
2014.
253 Italy Transfer Migrants from Scandal-Hit Centre, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE -
ENGLISH, Dec. 24, 2013.
254 Frances D'Emilio, Africans Aboard Boats from Libya Reach Italian Islands;
Residents Protest on Mainland, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Mar. 27, 2011.
255 Italian Navy Rescues Over 1,000 Immigrants in 24 Hours, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS
SERVICE, Feb. 6, 2014, http://www.finlandtimes.fi/europe/2014/02/07/4672/ Italian-
navy-rescues-over-1,000-migrants-in-24-hours. Most boats that head to Italy originate
in Libya, and many migrants are often subject to smuggling along the route. See
Matina Stevis, Behind Lampedusa Shipwreck: A Journey of Perils and Profits; Vast
and Lucrative Migrant-Smuggling Business Defies Europe's Crackdown Efforts, The
Wall Street Journal Online.
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Italy has been especially criticized for its notorious use of
deportations, having both employed the tactic to send asylum seekers
to other European Union Member States and back to Libya, among
other nations. Prior to the recent turmoil in Libya, Italy had agreed to a
bilateral treaty with Libya that took effect in March 2009, which
allowed Italy to "push back" African immigrants without first screen-
ing them for asylum claims.256 In Hirsi-Jamaa & Others v. Italy, the
European Court of Human Rights struck down such an agreement,
and called for restitution to the group of twenty-four Eritrean and
Somali immigrants who were interdicted in the Mediterranean Sea and
subsequently returned to Libya due to the fact they faced the risk of
repatriation to their home countries in violation of non-refoulement.257 In
another instance, when Italy sought to return asylum seekers to abu-
sive conditions in Greece, pursuant to the Dublin II Regulation,
without reviewing their claims, they were rebuffed due to the fact that
Greece had been unable to provide the individuals with basic require-
ments of safety and shelter.258 In essence, Greece had been found to be
an unsafe third country.
Despite the tumultuousness the asylum seekers face in Italy,
and the criticism Italy has received in its implementation of asylum
law, Italy statistically ranks towards the top of the European Union in
both first instance decisions and final decisions. Italy returned a posi-
tive decision on approximately 80.7 percent of first time, colorable
claim decisions in 2012, second only to Malta. 259 Additionally, out of
Member States that made over 350 final decisions on asylum
256 Valarie Blake, Mass African Migration Into Europe: Human Rights and State
Obligations, 32 HAMLNE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 135, 152 (2010).
257 Hirsi-Jamaa & Others v. Italy [GC], App. No. 27765/09, ECHR, at 58-59 (2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx7i=001-109231. For a
summary of the case, see Ross K. Holberg, Current Development: Developments in the
International Field: Italy's Policy ofPushing Back African Migrants on the High Seas
Rejected by the European Court ofHuman Rights in the Case ofHirsi Jamaa & Others
v. Italy, 26 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 467 (Winter 2012). The United States has espoused such
a summary view of Haitian migrants. Attorney General John Ashcroft has encouraged
that the United States summarily deport or detain Haitian migrants entering irregularly.
In re D-J, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003), United States Attomey-General, 17 April
2003, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5734684.html.
258 Column: Region: Europe: Italy's Return of Asylum Seekers to Greece Raises
Human Rights Concerns, 20 HuM. RTs. BR. 63 (Spring 2013).
259 European Asylum Statistics, supra note 2.
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applications in 2012, Italy ranked second, returning approximately 64
percent positive decisions. 260 However, the United Nations has pub-
lished figures that shed Italy in a much less flattering light regarding
its asylum applications decisions. According to the UNHCR, of the
22,442 decisions Italy made during 2012 (including both first instance
and final decisions), 13,898 were summarily rejected.261 In any event,
Italy continues to violate the Convention by placing asylum seekers in
detention, severely restricting many of their rights. Further, through
their actions in the past, Italy has teetered with the possibility of
violating non-refoulement by returning asylum seekers to countries that
run the risk of violating their rights or repatriating them to the nations
they came from.
B. Asylum Statistics of Asylees from Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan
Eritrea's asylum recognition rate is among the highest in the
world.2 62 Eritrea's recognition rate, including both refugee status and
other complimentary protection status, rated sixth-highest in the world
in 2012, behind only South Sudan, Maldives, Cayman Islands, Syrian
Arab Republic, and Andorra.263 Maldives, Cayman Islands, and
Andorra all had 20 or fewer decisions returned.264 Israel returned a
70.4 percent recognition rate on asylum applications from Eritrea.265
However, this number was based on only 27 decisions in 2012, a low
number that reflects how Israel chooses to systematically defer deci-
sions regarding the asylum status of applicants. Malta returned an 81.0
percent recognition rate, a number that is not far below the interna-
tional recognition rate.26 6 However, both countries' positive decision
260 id
261 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Statistical Yearbook 2012
(2013).
262 Id
263 Id. Total recognition rate is determined by the UNHCR by adding recognized plus
other positive decisions, divided by total number of recognized, other positive
decisions, and rejected.
264 Id. For specific asylum statistics that takes into account both country of origin and
country of application, see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
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rates rank among the lowest in the world.26 7 In total, 26,711 decisions
were made in 2011, including 19,779 positive decisions that granted
full Convention status upon asylum seekers from Malta, 1,781
decisions granting complimentary status, and 2,586 rejections. 268
Somalia's asylum recognition rate stood at 79.1 percent for
2012, although Convention status was only given in 55.0 percent of
asylum applications.269 Somalia's asylum recognition rate ranked
eleventh in the world in 2012.270 Of the 30,318 decisions made
regarding asylum applications of Somalians in 2012, only 4,939 were
outright rejections. Of the positive decisions returned, 13,013 granted
full Convention rights upon the asylees, and 5,717 granted complimen-
tary status. 271 Malta returned a relatively high recognition rate for
asylum applications from Somalians, returning a positive decision on
98.5 percent of applications.272 Malta's shortcomings in its treatment of
Somalians do not lie in its recognition rate, but rather the process it
undertakes in reaching its rate.
Sudanese asylum applications have a 71.8 percent recognition
rate, including a 68.2 percent recognition rate of full Convention
267 Id. Of note, Italy returned an 89.8 percent recognition rate, Sudan returned a 99.7
percent recognition rate, United Kingdom returned an 88.5 percent recognition rate,
and the United States returned an 86.9 percent recognition rate. Canada, Djibouti,
Kenya, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yemen all returned recognition rates of 90 percent
or higher. In reporting specific recognition rates from countries, the UNHCR provides
different numbers based on what is available for every country. In the instance of
Eritreans in Israel and Malta, the numbers provided were based solely on first instance
decisions. The numbers provided for Italy, Sudan, and the United Kingdom also
reflected recognition rates for first instance decisions, while the numbers provided for




270 Id. Only Bhutan, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Estonia,
Maldives, Myanmar, Qatar, South Sudan, and the Syrian Arab Republic.
271 Id
272 Id. Of the countries to return a significant number of decisions on asylum
applications, only Indonesia, Mozambique, Sudan, and Uganda returned higher
recognition rates. Comparatively, Canada returned a 92.7 percent recognition rate, Italy
returned a 96.5 recognition rate (including only a 28.5 percent Convention status
recognition rate), the United Kingdom returned a 43.4 percent recognition rate, and the
United States returned a 65.5 percent recognition rate.
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status. 273 Of the 17,258 decisions returned in 2012, 7,058 granted full
Convention status upon the asylees, 371 granted complimentary status,
while 2,918 were rejections and 6,891 decisions were otherwise closed.
The UNHCR did not provide specific statistics for decisions regarding
Sudanese asylum applications in Israel and Malta for 2012. In Israel,
this may be attested to the overall trend that the government does not
make decisions regarding substantive numbers of applications. In
order to be included as a country of asylum application for any specific
origin nation, a country must have returned a minimum number of
asylum decisions. Nations with the highest number of Sudanese
asylum applications return a wide range of recognition rates, ranging
from 8.5 percent recognition rate of first instance decisions in France to
100.0 percent recognition rate of first instance appeal decisions in
Chad.274
XVI. CONCLUSION: COMPARING ISRAEL'S AND MALTA'S ASYLUM
PROCEDURE PITFALLS
Although Malta and Israel are often grouped together due to
their geographical proximity to refugees from the Horn of Africa, it is
apparent that the two nations differ greatly in their treatment of
asylum applications. In Israel, theoretically, the proper asylum proce-
dures are in place; practically, however, they are never practiced in line
with the procedures the Convention requires. Israel has provided the
guidelines for individual asylum hearings, but Inversely, Malta fails to
even have procedures put in place for asylum applicants. Instead, as
previously mentioned, Malta must fall back on its own Immigration
Law to handle illegal entrants, which include, per Malta's procedures,
asylum seekers.
Prior to the overturning of Amendment No. 3 to the Anti-
Infiltration Law, Israel employed mandatory detention for asylum
seekers who came across their borders, which is in clear contravention
of Article 31 of the Convention. Additionally, under the "Hot Return"
policy Israel implemented with Egypt, Israel ran afoul of non-
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had not taken the time to screen or determine whether the returned
refugees would face grave danger to their lives or safety.
Since the adoption of the most recent Amendment to the Anti-
Infiltration Law, mandatory detention has been replaced. However,
the current practice of asylum procedures in Israel beg the question
whether procedures that are theoretically permissible, but practically
impossible, are still illegal under the Convention violating the spirit
and perhaps also the letter of the law. The purpose of the Convention
is to protect refugees in their quest for asylum, regardless of how it is
implemented. 275 Therefore, Israel's implementation of policies causes it
to fail to fulfill its obligations under the Convention. The fact remains
the current system in Israel makes it nearly impossible for asylum
seekers to pursue their rights under the Convention. For example,
Israel is in contravention of Article 34 by bureaucratically delaying any
possibility most refugees have for naturalization. By affording group
protection of all refugees, Israel may not be in contravention of non-
refoulement, one of the essential pillars of the Convention.276 As is
evident by the fact Israel makes minimal effort to determine final
status, asylum seekers entangled in group protection status are not
given any opportunity to receive other rights under the Convention.
Until asylum seekers receive Convention protection, they are not given
the right to keep or seek gainful employment, which violates Article 17
of the Convention. 277 It is nearly impossible for the poverty-stricken
asylum seekers to gain self-employment due to their status. 27 8 This is
also due to the emergence of a new unofficial Israeli policy not to
renew the visas of African asylum seekers. 279 Israeli officials also insti-
tute procedures that make it near impossible to renew their visas. For
275 Convention, supra note 24, Introductory Note.
276 Convention, supra note 24, at art. 33.
277 This is in contravention of Article 17 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24,
at art. 17. However, the most recent position by the government is that it will not
prosecute employers who employ 2(a)(5) license holders. Technically, the asylum
seekers must also acquire a B/i work visa, which may or may not be issued. HIAS
Israel, supra note 65.
278 This is in contravention of Article 18 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24,
at art. 18.
279 African Asyium Seekers in Israel Denied Visas, YNET NEWS, Dec. 29, 2013,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4470908,00.html.
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example, many visa offices close, putting the asylum seekers at risk of
arrest.280
Further, in practice, Israel has not lived up to the promises it
has made within its own asylum procedures. As noted, very few
venues are provided for administrative assistance, including lack of
legal assistance to allow the asylum seekers the opportunity to chal-
lenge their rejection. 281 Asylum seekers who hold the aforementioned
2(a)(5) license permits are not eligible for social benefits, 282 non-
emergency medical treatment,283 and are not permitted to work.284
Those asylum seekers kept in the open detention center may, facially,
retain most rights under the Convention, but due to the harsh
conditions and requirements of residing in the distant open detention
center, it becomes nearly impossible for those asylum seekers to
exercise their rights under the Convention. Three roll calls a day, along
with the overnight period when the center closes, make it virtually
impossible for detainees to gain employment285 or exercise their right
to freedom of movement. 286 Their rights are especially curbed as it
compares to nationals of Israel, which is contravention of the Conven-
tion.28 7 The fact that these asylum seekers are being held in the open
280 Gabriel Avner, Asylum Seekers Face Harsh Obstacles for Visas, Mar. 12, 2014,
JERUSALEM ONLINE, http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/in-israel/local/watch-
asylum- seekers-face-harsh-obstacles-for-visas-4224.
281 Yaron, Hasimshony-Yaffe, & Campbell, supra note 3, at 7.
282 This is in contravention of Article 24 of the Convention. Covention, supra note 24,
at art. 24.
283 This is in contravention of any of a number of articles of the Convention, depending
on how you interpret the Article. For example, see Convention, supra note 24, at art.
23, 25.
284 Declining to give work permits to certain asylum seekers is in contravention of
Article 17 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24, at art. 17.
285 This is in contravention of Article 17 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24,
at art. 17. However, those held in the open detention center may apply to work at the
center. 179 detainees had applied for jobs, and 78 had been hired to work there. This
still severely restricts the rights of the detainees to seek out lawful employment, and
therefore is still in contravention of Article 17. Lior, Two African Countries, supra note
166.
286 This is in contravention of Article 26 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24,
at art. 26.
287 Under the Convention, asylum seekers are to be afforded the same rights as
nationals of the application country. For examples, see Convention, supra note 24, art.
22, stating "The Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is
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detention center solely for entering the country illegally, have their
right to non-penalization under Article 31 of the Convention denied.288
Further, those taken directly from detention out of the country have
been said to have their rights breached, according to the United
Nations. 289 In sum, it appears that Israel's asylum procedures on paper
would fulfill its obligations under the Convention. However, in prac-
tice, Israel has failed in its responsibilities. It is not the law a signatory
to the Convention puts in place that releases a country from its
obligations, but rather in practice how it provides the rights necessary
to asylum seekers. Israel, in this respect, has failed its Convention
obligations.
Malta, in comparison to Israel, has taken a substantially dif-
ferent path in its treatment of asylum seekers. Due to its lack of formal
procedures regarding asylum seekers, the government treats all illegal
entrants the same way under the Immigration Act, including asylum
seekers. Under the Immigration Act, any entrants who enter Malta
irregularly are subject to automatic detention.290 Therefore, any asylum
seeker who enters Malta is automatically detained simply due to the
fact he is entering the country illegally, which is in clear contravention
of Article 31 of the Convention. 291 It is important to note that under the
relevant articles of the Convention, asylum seekers are to be guaran-
teed some of the same rights and opportunities as though they were a
national of the country in which they are seeking asylum. 2 92 While in
accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education"; Convention, supra note
24, art. 20, stating "Where a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at
large and regulates the general distribution of products in short supply, refugees shall
be accorded the same treatment as nationals."
288 Convention, supra note 24, at art. 31. Israel maintains that the asylum seekers are
being held for not following legal procedures regarding their asylum, which they
maintain is permissible. However, the asylum seekers are jailed due to nearly
impossible conditions of continuing their legal residency, which would be as much a
violation of the Convention as if they were arrested simply for arriving illegally.
289 Lior, Two African Countries, supra note 166.
290 Immigration Act, supra note 216, at art. 5.
291 Convention, supra note 24, at art. 31.
292 For examples, see Convention, supra note 24, art. 22, stating "The Contracting
States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with
respect to elementary education"; Convention, supra note 24, art. 20, stating "Where a
rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and regulates the
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detention, this is impossible. Many of their rights are severely under-
cut, including their rights to movable and immovable property, 29 3
public education,294 both wage-earning and self-employment, 295 and
freedom of movement.296 Further, Malta's systematic and automatic
detention of all asylum seekers is administered in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, which violates accepted European law. 29 7 Addi-
tionally, due to the fact remedies provided to asylum seekers in Malta
are procedurally deficient, Malta has not ensured that the refugees
have full access to the courts.298
There is no dispute regarding Israel and Malta's violations of
the Convention and Protocol. However, the reasons Israel and Malta
provide for their treatment of asylum seekers should perhaps not be
summarily dismissed. Malta has, for example, cited its lack of area as a
chief concern in allowing asylum seekers to live in the country freely.
However, Malta has recently begun allowing wealthy foreigners the
right to purchase European Union citizenship if they choose to do
So. 29 9 Malta has therefore decided to claim that it cannot to open its
borders to poor asylum seekers, but is able to do so for those that can
contribute financially to the country. This appears to counter Malta's
argument that it is unable to accommodate any new citizens. Malta has
also cited its inability to cope with such large numbers of asylum
application as is required of them under the Dublin II Regulation. This
argument may carry greater weight, as there has been an unequal
general distribution of products in short supply, refugees shall be accorded the same
treatment as nationals."
293 This is in contravention of Article 13 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24,
at art. 13. Upon arrival, the immigration authorities confiscate any money which the
detainee may have had with him. See UJNHCR's Position, supra note 214, at 53.
294 This is in contravention of Article 22 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24,
art. 22. For example, in the Hal-Far tent village detention center, the entire center has
access to only one classroom. Hammarberg, supra note 231.
295 This is in contravention of Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention. Convention, supra
note 24, art. 17 & 18.
296 This is in contravention of Article 26 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24,
art. 26.
297 Detention Guidelines, supra note 224, at 18.
298 This is in contravention of Article 16 of the Convention. Convention, supra note 24,
art. 16.
299 Dan Bilefsky, Treasure for Sale in Malta: Citizenship for the Rich, INTERNATIONAL
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, at 4.
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share of asylum applications in the southern European Union nations
that border the Mediterranean Sea.300 It would appear Malta's chief
reasoning for denying proper treatment for asylum seekers has at least
some gap.
Israel's justifications in denying proper treatment to African
refugees also carries some weight. Israel has stated time and again its
intention to remain a Jewish state, which is embodied in its Declaration
of Independence and Law of Return. This principle has guided Israel's
policy towards immigrants, allowing Jews from outside of Israel to
return to Israel to make Aliyah. Due to this, Israel has rejected African
asylum seekers, but has orchestrated operations to rescue Jews from all
over the world, most notably Ethiopia.301 However, Israel continues to
maintain itself as a democratic state. There is an inevitable contradic-
tion between a purely religious state and a purely democratic state. In
Israel's case, by excluding and denying rights to non-Jews, it is curtail-
ing the democratic characteristic of the state by encroaching on indivi-
dual freedoms. " [H]armonizing Jewish law with complete freedom
religious coercion is impossible."302 Despite its commitment to a Jewish
state, Israel has recently begun curbing the religious rights of some
Jews by passing a bill curbing exemptions for the national draft that
would mandate ultra-Orthodox Jews be subject to conscription.30 3 This
has led to the ultra-Orthodox Jews fearing that they will be exposed to
300 Junker, supra note 203.
301 From November 2010 to August 2013, Israel engaged in Operation Dove's Wings,
the government's attempt to bring around 7,000 Jews to Israel from Ethiopia. By the
time the operation had finished, the Jewish community in Ethiopia had grown extinct.
Ethiopia; The Last Jews ofEthiopia?, AFRICA NEws, Oct. 21, 2013.
302 Basehva E. Genut, Competing Visions of the Jewish State: Promoting and
Protecting Freedom of Religion in Israel, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2120, 2178 (June
1996). For a competing view that states it is possible to overcome this gap, see Elazar
Nachalon, Structural Models ofReligion and State in Jewish and Democratic Political
Thought: The Inevitable Contradiction? The Challenge for Israel, 22 TOURO L. REV.
613 (2006).
303 Isabel Kershner, Israel Passes Bill Curbing Exemptions for the Draft,
INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMEs, Mar. 14, 2014, at 8. Israel mandates military
service for all able-bodied Jews starting at age 18. It was until this recent decision by
the Israeli Parliament that ultra-Orthodox Jews had been exempt from the military
draft.
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secularism. 304 It appears to be somewhat contradictory for Israel to
expose Jews to influences that go against what their religion stands for.
Additionally, Israel approves approximately 70,000 foreign workers'
visas each year.305 It would appear Israel can afford to open its borders
to foreign workers of its choosing, but yet chooses not to do so for
asylum seekers. Israel's chief reasoning as to why it refuses proper
treatment to asylum seekers, therefore, is lacking.
In sum, it appears that substantively both Malta and Israel
subject their asylum seekers to the same violations of the Convention,
but procedurally they do so in very different ways. Malta's violations
occur as a result of its mandatory detention under the Immigration
Act, and its lack of asylum procedure, whereas Israel's violations stem
from a systematic effort to deny asylum seekers their procedural rights
while remaining facially committed to the articles of the Convention.
Malta does eventually provide rulings on asylum applications, as is
evidenced by statistics from both the European Union and United
Nations, whereas Israel does not meet this requirement.306 While the
procedure employed by Malta is in clear violation of the Convention,
the end result appears to be satisfactory, especially considering the
overall negative global trend regarding asylum applications.307 Of note
especially is that Malta's asylum recognition rate is well above that of
similarly situated countries on the southern edge of the European
continent.308 Moreover, Malta's ill treatment is unfortunately common-
304 Nathan Jeffay, Fear and Loathing Hands Over the Army's Abyss of Depravity';
Ultra-Orthodox Jews Worry that the Loss of Their Exemption from Conscription will
Expose Them to the Dangers of Securalism, Reports Nathan Jeffay, THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 22, 2014, at 64.
305 Shallya Scher and Hailey Dilman, Opinion, Discovering the Truth About Israel's
Asylum-Seekers Amid the Muths and Distrotions, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 13, 2014,
available at http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Discovering-the-truth-
about-Israels-asylum-seekers-amid-the-myths-and-distortions-338068.
306 Theoretically, as previously mentioned, Israel does have the proper groundwork to
apply correct asylum procedures that are in line with their obligations under the
Convention, but, in practice, fails to do so.
307 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Statistical Yearbook 2012
(2013).
308 Greece, notorious for its ill treatment of asylum seekers, provided positive decisions
on only 627 asylum applications (only 217 of which provided complete Convention
protection) compared to 12,214 rejections in 2012. Cyprus had an equally low positive
decision rate, providing 128 positive decisions (including 85 decisions granting full
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place among signatories, as is evidenced by comparing Malta's proce-
dures and attempted solutions with those of Italy. Israel, meanwhile,
not only employs procedures that are in violation of the Convention,
but also ensures results that do not live up to the responsibilities of a
Convention signatory. It is evident that combating the issues asylum
seekers face in both Israel and Malta requires two very separate analy-
ses and understandings. Despite the similarities of the two nations,
there is no uniform solution to the issues both nations face with their
asylum seekers. As substantive as their reasoning may be for denying
proper treatment to asylum seekers, both countries must tackle their
specific differences and live up to their obligations as signatories to the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
Convention protection) compared to 2,561 rejections in 2012. United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees: Statistical Yearbook 2012 (2013).
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